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Abstract. The article introduces a new concept of structure, defined, echoing J. A. Wheeler’s 
concept of “law without law,” as a “structure without law,” and a new philosophical viewpoint, that 
of structural nonrealism, and considers how this concept and this viewpoint work in quantum theory 
in general and quantum information theory in particular. It takes as its historical point of departure 
W. Heisenberg's discovery of quantum mechanics, which, the article argues, could, in retrospect, be 
considered in quantum-informational terms, while, conversely, quantum information theory could 
be seen in Heisenbergian terms. The article takes advantage of the circumstance that any instance 
of quantum information is a “structure”—an organization of elements, ultimately bits, of classical 
information, manifested in measuring instruments. While, however, this organization can, along 
with the observed behavior of measuring instruments, be described by means of classical physics, it 
cannot be predicted by means of classical physics, but only, probabilistically or statistically, by 
means of quantum mechanics, or in high-energy physics, by means of quantum field theory (or 
possibly some alternative theories within each scope). By contrast, the emergence of this 
information and of this structure cannot, in the present view, be described by either classical or 
quantum theory, or possibly by any other means, which leads to the concept of “structure without 
law” and the viewpoint of structural nonrealism. The article also considers, from this perspective, 
some recent work in quantum information theory. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The article introduces a new concept of structure, defined, echoing J. A. Wheeler’s concept 
of “law without law,” as a “structure without law,” and a new philosophical viewpoint, that 
of structural nonrealism, and considers how this concept and this viewpoint work in 
quantum theory in general and quantum information theory in particular. It takes as its 
historical point of departure W. Heisenberg’s thinking leading him to his discovery of 
quantum mechanics, as matrix mechanics. I shall argue that, while this thinking could not 
be rigorously claimed to be quantum-informational, it could be viewed as quantum-
informational in spirit, and conversely, quantum information theory could be viewed as 
Heisenbergian in spirit.1 N. Bohr, in his initial assessment of Heisenberg’s discovery in 
1925 (before E. Schrödinger’s introduction of his wave version), described Heisenberg’s 
thinking and his “new quantum mechanics” as follows: 
                                                        
1 This view was initially proposed by the present author in (Plotnitsky 2002) and developed in 
(Plotnitsky 2016), without, however, casting it in terms of structural nonrealism.  
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In contrast to ordinary mechanics, the new quantum mechanics does not deal with a space–
time description of the motion of atomic particles. It operates with manifolds of quantities 
[matrices] which replace the harmonic oscillating components of the motion and symbolize 
the possibilities of transitions between stationary states in conformity with the 
correspondence principle [which requires that quantum and classical predictions coincide 
in the classical limit]. These quantities satisfy certain relations which take the place of the 
mechanical equations of motion and the quantization rules [of the old quantum theory]. 
(Bohr 1987, v. 1, p. 48; emphasis added)  
 
This was a radical departure from the preceding history of modern physics, from 
Galileo’s mechanics to A. Einstein’s relativity and even to the previous (“old”) quantum 
theory. All these theories were based on such descriptions or representations, either 
phenomenally visualizable, at least in dealing with elemental individual processes, as, for 
example, in classical mechanics, or beyond visualization but given a conceptual or 
mathematical representation, as, for example, in relativity when dealing with photons and 
velocities close to c. While we can give the relativistic behavior of photons a concept 
expressible in language and represent it mathematically, we have no phenomenal means 
of visualizing this behavior, or the behavior represented by Einstein’s velocity-addition 
formula. This was the first physical theory that defeated our ability to form a phenomenal 
conception of an elemental physical process, and, as such, it was in turn a radical change 
in the history of physics. The reason that it worried Einstein less than the situation that 
emerged as regards the behavior of the elemental constituents of nature in quantum 
physics was that relativity still offered a conceptual-mathematical representation (causal 
in character) of the relativistic behavior in question, an aspect of Einstein’s view that I 
shall consider below. Ultimately, photons are quantum objects and are treated by 
quantum electrodynamics, which, in the view adopted here, no longer represents the 
behavior of quantum objects in the corresponding (high-energy) regimes even 
mathematically, any more than quantum mechanics does. Classical statistical physics still 
relied and indeed depended on the representational treatment of the behavior of the 
elemental constituents of the multiplicities considered, such as the molecules of a gas, 
constituents that were viewed as behaving in accordance with the laws of classical 
mechanics. The description of individual quantum objects and the corresponding 
mathematical representation became partial in the so-called old quantum theory, such as 
Bohr’s atomic theory, introduced in 1913 and developed by him and others over the 
following decade. The old quantum theory only provided such a description and 
mathematical representation, in terms of orbits, for stationary states of electrons in atoms, 
but not for the transitions, “quantum jumps,” between stationary states. For that reason, 
the old quantum theory was called “semi-classical.” Heisenberg, as Bohr’s statement just 
cited explained, abandoned a geometrical representation of stationary states as well and, 
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thus, any description or representation, even a mathematical one, of the behavior of 
quantum objects. In his scheme, stationary states were only represented by energy-level 
values, considered apart from representing the behavior of electrons themselves to which 
these energy levels were assigned. The theory thus only was only concerned with 
transition probabilities between physical states, indeed between events observed in 
measuring instruments impacted by quantum objects, and not with the physical behavior 
of quantum objects, such as electrons, in space and time, represented along geometrical 
lines, as in classical physics or relativity. As such, Heisenberg’s theory may also be seen 
in terms of transitions from geometry to algebra in fundamental physics, which 
compelled Einstein to speak of Heisenberg’s “purely algebraic method.” As he said: 
“perhaps the success of the Heisenberg method points to a purely algebraic method of 
description of nature, that is, to the elimination of continuous functions from physics [as 
the way of representing physical reality]. Then, however, we must give up, in principle, 
the space–time continuum” (Einstein 1936, p. 378). (Einstein 1936, p. 378). I shall return 
to this aspect of Heisenberg’s discovery in Section 4. 
For the moment, Heisenberg’s approach may be thought of in quantum-informational 
terms because the quantum-mechanical situation, as he conceived of it (initially dealing 
with hydrogen spectra), was in effect defined by: 
 
(a) certain already obtained information, concerning the energy of an electron, derived 
from spectral lines (due to the emission of radiation by the electron), observed in measuring 
instruments; and  
(b) certain possible future information, concerning the energy of this electron, to be 
obtainable from spectral lines to be observed in measuring instruments and predictable, 
unavoidably (on experimental grounds) in probabilistic or statistical terms, by means of the 
mathematical formalism of one or another quantum theory. 
 
Heisenberg’s strategy was to develop a mathematical formalism that would connect 
these two sets of data, manifested in measuring instruments, only in predictive terms, 
moreover (in accord with what is actually observed in quantum experiments), in strictly 
probabilistically or statistically predictive terms, without assuming that this formalism 
needed to represent how these two sets of data or information are connected by a 
spatiotemporal process or how each set comes about, in the first place. This type of 
representation or the physical conception of the processes that would be thus represented 
mathematically (again, still possible in Bohr’s atomic theory in the case of stationary states) 
did not appear possible at the time and has not been possible since, at least not in a way 
generally agreed upon. Heisenberg’s mathematical scheme did not represent anything at 
the time of measurement either: it only predicted transition probabilities between situations 
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defined by measurements, those already performed, which provide the numerical data that 
serve as the experimental basis for these predictions, and possible future ones. 
Part of the mathematical structure of Heisenberg’s scheme was provided by the 
equations of classical mechanics, directly borrowed by Heisenberg in accordance with the 
correspondence principle, suitably modified by Heisenberg, as explained in Section 4. 
Classical variables, however, would only give correct predictions in the classical limit, for 
example, in the case of large quantum numbers for electrons, where their behavior could 
be treated classically, even though the corresponding processes would still need to be 
assumed to be quantum. To remedy this failure, Heisenberg replaced classical variables 
with new variables, of a type never used in physics previously. They were complex-valued 
(infinite-dimensional) matrix variables, essentially Hilbert-space operators, in J. von 
Neumann’s more rigorous version of the formalism, introduced shortly thereafter, and 
commonly used ever since. 
Heisenberg’s approach was quickly extended to other quantum predictions, all in 
general probabilistic or statistical in nature. Any such prediction was, again, concerned 
with a future measurement and the information it would provide, the information 
manifested only as an effect of the interaction between the quantum object considered and 
a suitable measuring apparatus, on the basis of a previously performed measurement and 
the information obtained from it, manifested as the same type of effect. 
One was, thus, no longer concerned, as in classical physics or relativity, with 
predicting, even in the case of elemental individual processes, the space-time behavior of 
the objects considered due to (continuous) changes in their states, assumed to be definable 
independently of the interactions between objects and measuring instruments, and 
representable by the corresponding mathematical formalism. Instead, following Bohr’s 
thinking in his 1913 atomic theory and related approaches found in the old quantum theory, 
one was thinking in terms of discontinuous transitions between physical states of quantum 
objects and in terms of predicting the probabilities or statistics of such transitions, as only 
probabilistic predictions were possible experimentally.2 These states are, moreover, only 
manifested as effects of the interactions between quantum objects and measuring 
instruments. While not part of Bohr’s thinking or at least not part of his argumentation in 
his 1913 theory, this understanding became central to his thinking following Heisenberg’s 
discovery of quantum mechanics and came to define Bohr’s interpretation of quantum 
mechanics and quantum phenomena themselves.3  
                                                        
2 I am indebted to L. Freidel for this observation, discussed in (Freidel 2016). 
3 Although quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics are commonly interpreted jointly within 
the same framework, as they are in Bohr or in this article, these are separate entities, each of which 
could be given its own interpretation. Besides, quantum phenomena in the same interpretation, could 
be handled by different theories. 
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This article will explore the implications of quantum-theoretical thinking, from 
Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics to quantum information theory, for the idea of structure 
in physics and beyond, most especially, as announced from the outset, the concept of 
structure without law and the viewpoint of structural nonrealism, which are this article’s 
main contributions. A qualification is in order before I proceed. 
The argument of this article belongs to the philosophy of physics. It represents, 
however, a different form of philosophy of physics, vis-à-vis most other forms of the 
institutional philosophy of physics, specifically the philosophy of quantum theory, apart 
from some more historically oriented studies, where some aspects of the present approach 
could occasionally be found. This difference is especially reflected in my emphasis on 
thinking concerning physics, which emphasis defines the philosophy of physics in 
question. It is the philosophy of thinking in fundamental physics, by which I mean those 
areas of experimental and theoretical physics that are concerned with the ultimate 
constitution of nature, as we, as human beings, understand this constitution. I qualify 
because, in the view adopted by this article, this constitution could only be assumed as 
something conceived by the human mind or something assumed to be beyond human 
conception. The thinking in questions refers to both thinking by the key figures considered 
here and our own thinking, that of this article’s readers included. It may, it is true, happen 
that the same theory results from a different way of thinking, as was in fact the case in 
Heisenberg’s nonrealist thinking and Schrödinger’s realist thinking that, nevertheless, led 
each of them to quantum mechanics. This difference is diminished by the fact that 
Schrödinger could not entirely avoid some of the quantum principles used by Heisenberg, 
principles that resisted realism and, as a result, created tensions within Schrödinger’s 
scheme, which he was ultimately unable to resolve. In any event, if anything, this potential 
for different ways of thinking to arrive at the same theory makes this approach to the 
philosophy of physics all the more relevant. 
It is important, however, that this philosophical argument does involve physics. Indeed, 
it is as much about physics as about the philosophy of physics, by definition, because this 
argument concerns thinking about physics. This fact is often missed in dealing with certain 
philosophically oriented arguments, as it has often been in response to Bohr’s work, 
sometimes alleged not to have involved any new physics. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. It is true that Bohr’s work did not offer any new mathematics of quantum theory 
or new experimental findings, and the lack of both, especially the former, has sometimes 
served to claim that there was no new physics either. But that does not mean that there was 
no new physics in his argumentation. Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and 
quantum mechanics was also new physics.  
I shall proceed as follows. The next section gives a general introduction to structural 
nonrealism. Section 3, first, outlines the fundamental concepts used by it, such as “reality,” 
“theory,” “model,” “structure,” “causality,” “complementarity,” and the concept of concept 
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itself, and then addresses some of the key physical and philosophical implications of 
structural nonrealism. Section 4 revisits Heisenberg’s discovery of quantum mechanics as 
a program of advancing from fundamental physical principles to mathematical structures, 
in the absence of the space-time description of the behavior of quantum objects, an 
approach that anticipated, correlatively, both structural nonrealism and quantum 
informational thinking. As such, it also prepared Bohr’s interpretation of quantum 
phenomena and quantum mechanics, considered in this section as well. Section 5 offers a 
discussion of certain parallel ways of thinking in some recent approaches to quantum 
information theory.  
 
2. From Quantum Information to Structural Nonrealism 
 
This article aims to give a conceptual grounding to, and to explore the implications of, the 
fact that quantum information (a concept that shall be applied here to essentially all data in 
question in quantum physics) is defined by a special set of structures of physically classical 
information, gathered from the data found in measuring instruments impacted by quantum 
objects, the existence of which is in fact inferred from this structure. By “structure” I refer 
to the character, sometimes organized and sometimes indeterminate or random (I shall 
explain these terms and differences between them below, treating them as interchangeable 
for now), of units (bits) of information, which are effects of the interactions between 
quantum objects and measuring instruments, effects manifested, as the data associated with 
quantum events, in the observable parts of these instruments. Using the term “structure” in 
this sense may be unorthodox. The term more customarily refers to a strictly organized 
collection of elements and the rule-governed relationships among them, such as a group in 
mathematics, and it will be used in this sense here as well, in particular when referring to 
mathematical structures, such as those defining the formalisms of physical theories. When, 
however, it comes to quantum data or information, the structures in question are, first, only 
organized in the sense of being statistically correlated. Secondly, they are so correlated 
only in certain specified experimental circumstances and are indeterminate or random in 
certain other specified experimental circumstances, always mutually exclusive with those 
of the first type, while, importantly, always allowing us to choose either one corresponding 
experimental setup or the other. This mutual exclusivity is a manifestation of Bohr’s 
concept of complementarity, explained below. The structures of quantum information thus 
combine indeterminacy or randomness and a statistically correlated organization of a 
particular type, not found in classical physics or relativity, and hereafter referred to as 
“quantum correlations.” Finally, and arguably most characteristically and most crucially, 
even quantum correlations still involve indeterminacy or randomness, because these 
correlations only pertain to certain collectivities of events, registered in the corresponding 
experimental devices, while each individual event involved remains an independent event 
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as concerns our predictions about it.4 It is a matter of interpretation whether such an event 
could be assigned, say, on Bayesian lines, a probability of occurrence and thus is merely 
indeterminate, or cannot be assigned such a probability and is thus entirely random (in the 
present definition of “indeterminacy” and “randomness,” discussed in more detail below), 
as opposed to the statistics of multiple repeated, identically prepared, experiments. Such 
statistics can always be assigned and are well confirmed experimentally. The interpretation 
adopted here assumes the (strict) randomness of individual quantum events, while, 
however, keeping in mind the Bayesian view as a possible alternative. Quantum 
correlations themselves are collective, statistical, and as such they would not depend on 
either interpretation of our predictions concerning the individual events involved. The term 
“indeterminacy” (of our predictions concerning individual quantum events) will be used 
here to apply to both types of events and, thus, to either interpretation. Either way, that, in 
certain circumstances, indeterminate or random individual events form statistically 
correlated and thus statistically ordered multiplicities is one of the greatest mysteries, if not 
the greatest mystery, of quantum physics, which makes it as much about order as about 
indeterminacy and randomness. The order in question is, again, a statistically correlated 
order, or structure, without assuming the existence of an ontologically underlying classical 
order, or structure, that merely cannot be accessed epistemologically.  
Either in its organization or in its indeterminacy or randomness, and, in the first place, 
in its constitutive elements (each of which defines the quantum phenomenon associated 
with a quantum event), such a structure can, in each situation, be phenomenally represented 
by means of classical physics. Physically, quantum phenomena are defined by the fact that, 
in considering them, Planck’s constant, h, must be taken into account, which still allows 
one to use classical physics in describing them, although, again, not in predicting them. 
Quantum phenomena could only be predicted, thus far probabilistically or statistically (it 
is a matter of debate whether this indeterminism precludes some underlying causality), by 
means of an alternative, quantum, theory, which would inevitably contain h. The currently 
standard version of quantum theory, the only one to be considered in this article, is 
comprised of three theories.5 The first, discovered first as well, is quantum mechanics for 
continuous variables in infinite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces (QM), the second is quantum 
                                                        
4 The situation becomes more nuanced in the case of the famous thought experiment proposed by 
A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, the EPR experiment (Einstein et al 1935), discussed below, 
because in this case we deal with statistical correlations pertaining to multiple paired events. These 
nuances, however, do not affect my point at the moment, as explained in detail in (Plotnitsky 2016, 
pp. 136-154). 
5 Alternative theories of quantum phenomena, such as Bohmian mechanics, will only be mentioned 
in passing here. For convenience, the term quantum theory, too, will refer here to the standard 
versions of the three theories just described, although, technically, by virtue of dealing with quantum 
phenomena, such alternative theories are quantum theories as well.  
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theory for discrete variables in finite-dimensional Hilbert space (QTFD), and the third is 
quantum field theory in Hilbert spaces that are tensor products of finite and infinite 
dimensional Hilbert space (QFT). Such tensor products are also used in QM when one 
needs to incorporate spin, which was first done by W. Pauli (Pauli 1927). QFT, which 
handles high-energy physics, is currently comprised of several theories, jointly constituting 
the so-called standard model of particle physics: quantum electrodynamics (QED), the 
quantum field theory of weak forces, and the quantum field theory of strong forces, known 
as quantum chromodynamics (QCD). While the first two are unified or (as some prefer to 
see it) “merged” within the electroweak theory, the unification or merger of all three, 
sometimes referred to as “grand unification,” has not been accomplished. Several group-
theoretical models have been proposed, but none appears to be sufficiently satisfactory to 
be commonly accepted. Besides, achieving this unification is not always seen, including 
by this author, as imperative, insofar as the set of theories involved predict all the available 
data in their respective domains; there is, thus far, no experimental evidence that a grand 
unified theory of one kind or another is necessary. The capacity of QFT to quantize gravity 
is a different matter, because QFT and general relativity, the currently standard theory of 
gravity, are inconsistent with each other. This inconsistency is arguably the greatest 
outstanding problem of fundamental physics, which motivated string and then M-brane 
theories, and several alternative proposals, including in quantum information theory (e.g., 
Hardy 2007). 
The interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum theory adopted here, grounded 
in the viewpoint of “structural nonrealism,” takes a nonrealist view of both, a view that 
follows Heisenberg and Bohr, and, with them, “the Copenhagen spirit of quantum theory” 
[Kopenhagener Geist der Quantenheorie], as Heisenberg called it (Heisenberg 1930, p. 
iv).6 In most of this article, I will be concerned with QM, although I will give some attention 
to QTFD in the context of quantum information theory, which has, thus far, been primarily 
concerned with QTFD. QFT will only be mentioned in passing, although structural 
nonrealism fully applies in this case, and historically, QFT, beginning with QED, has been 
used to support the spirit of Copenhagen all along. I shall now outline the viewpoint of 
structural nonrealism and the corresponding interpretation of quantum phenomena and 
QM. 
It is worth recalling, first, that classical physics, specifically classical mechanics and 
classical electrodynamics, or relativity predicts the phenomena it considers because it 
offers an idealized representation of these phenomena and processes connecting them by 
means of mathematical models. In classical physics, these processes are assumed to be 
                                                        
6 This characterization, abbreviated here to “the spirit of Copenhagen,” is preferable to that of the 
Copenhagen interpretation, because there is no single such interpretation, even in the case of Bohr, 
who changed his views a few times, sometimes significantly.  
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causal, and predictions concerning them are ideally exact, deterministic, in the case of 
individual classical objects or small classical systems, handled by classical mechanics or 
classical electrodynamics. (Such theories are sometimes referred to as value-definitive.) I 
distinguish “causality” and “determinism,” referring by causality, ontologically, to the 
conception that the state of the system considered is determined at all future moments of 
time, once it is determined at a given moment of time, and by determinism, 
epistemologically, to the possibility of predicting the outcomes of such processes ideally 
exactly, although both concepts are connected and, at bottom, are co-defining in classical 
physics. This conception of causality, which defined physics since Galileo and Newton, or 
even Aristotle, and philosophy beginning at least with Plato, will be termed here “classical 
causality.” As will be seen, causality may be defined differently, first, in a relativistic or 
local sense (although relativity itself is a classically causal and indeed deterministic theory) 
and, second, in a quantum-theoretical probabilistic or statistical sense. All determinism, as 
here defined, is classical. There are, however, alternative definitions of determinism as 
well, including in QM, in particular referring to Schrödinger’s equation.  
Probabilistic or statistical classical theories, such as classical statistical physics or 
chaos theory, do introduce certain complications into the physics governed by classical 
causality. These complications are, however, not essential because the behavior of these 
systems is assumed to be at bottom classically causal and governed by classical mechanics, 
which makes these limitations merely a practical matter due to the mechanical complexity 
of these systems. This assumption grounds classical statistical physics and is well justified 
within its scope. Indeed, one could experimentally isolate, say, a molecule of a gas and 
make deterministic predictions concerning its behavior. Quantum aspects of its behavior 
could be neglected within the scope of classical statistical physics without affecting such 
predictions. 
The situation is fundamentally different in QM or QTFD and QFT, if one adopts a 
nonrealist, in-the-spirit-of-Copenhagen, view of these theories and of quantum phenomena 
themselves. While the physical content of all information obtainable from quantum 
phenomena can be physically represented by means of classical physics, the objects and 
processes, quantum in nature, responsible for the emergence of these phenomena and, 
hence, of the architecture of quantum information cannot be represented by means of QM, 
or conceivably by any other means, mathematical or not. This article takes an even stronger 
view, according to which, quantum objects and processes are not only beyond 
representation but are also, more radically, beyond conception: they are beyond the reach 
of thought altogether. Not all interpretations in the spirit of Copenhagen go that far. Thus, 
while there are indications in his writings that Bohr might have agreed with this view, he 
never expressly stated so. One could claim with more definitiveness that his argumentation 
implies that, even if such a conception is in principle possible, it could not be 
unambiguously used in in quantum theory (QM, QFT, QTFD). While this is a less stringent 
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prohibition, this difference is only essential philosophically and does not affect the physics 
involved. This is because, even though such a conception is in principle possible in this 
less stringent view, no conception of the ultimate nature of quantum objects and processes 
is available in either view, as things stand now, a crucial qualification that applies to the 
present position as well and is assumed throughout this article. I shall explain why this 
qualification is applicable even if one assumes that no conception concerning quantum 
objects and processes is possible at all, now or ever, and comment on other nuances 
involved in this situation in more detail below, also as concerns the relationships between 
the physical and mathematical conceptions involved. One could assume, and many do, the 
possibility of a mathematical representation of quantum objects and processes in the 
absence of any physical conception of them. While Bohr’s and the present interpretations 
of quantum phenomena and QM exclude this possibility as well, Heisenberg, appears to 
have been more open to it, in his later writings, along the lines of structural realism, a 
viewpoint discussed below. 
The probabilistic or statistical nature of quantum predictions, in nonrealist 
interpretations, in contrast to classical mechanics or electrodynamics, even in the case of 
elemental individual quantum processes, is unavoidable, because of the absence of not only 
determinism, which is an experimentally established fact, but also classical causality. This 
absence is automatic under either assumption: that of the impossibility of a representation, 
conceptual or mathematical or that of the impossibility of a conception of quantum objects 
and behavior. If no representation, let alone conception, of quantum processes is available 
it would be difficult to think of them as causal, which would imply at least a partial 
representation and certainly a partial conception of them.  
This does not preclude the possibility that the ultimate nature of the processes 
responsible for these phenomena (perhaps at levels beyond those currently covered by 
quantum theory in any of its forms, say, levels closer to Planck’s scale than these theories 
are) is classically causal or could, in the first place, be represented by the corresponding 
theory. For one thing, there is no way to be certain that any (apparently) indeterminate or 
random event or sequence of events is in fact indeterminate or random, rather than causally 
connected, and there is no proof in the mathematical theories dealing with indeterminacy 
and randomness that any actually is (Aronson 2013). However, classical causality or, in 
the first place, a representation of quantum processes and developing a corresponding 
interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM is, again, difficult to maintain, in view of 
several experimentally well-established features of quantum phenomena. I shall mention 
two of them here: the uncertainty relations and quantum correlations, both independent of 
QM and pertaining to quantum phenomena themselves. 
The uncertainty relations make it more difficult to define a classical-like state of the 
system considered, which appears to be required for causality, albeit, again, not altogether 
impossible. Thus, the uncertainty relations are fully valid in Bohmian mechanics, which is 
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realist and causal, but, it follows, not deterministic (in its predictions coincide with those 
of QM). Bohmian mechanics is, however, mathematically different from QM and, in 
addition, expressly violates the requirement of locality. The latter dictates that physical 
systems could only be physically influenced by their immediate environment or that the 
instantaneous transmission of physical influences between spatially separated physical 
systems, found in Bohmian mechanics, is forbidden. I shall discuss locality later, merely 
noting for now that, although locality is a more general concept, a violation of locality 
implies a violation of relativity, the validity of which is well established experimentally, 
which is one of the reasons why a violation of locality, such as that found in Bohmian 
mechanics, is commonly (there are exceptions) seen as undesirable. The requirement of 
locality adds to the difficulties of establishing a causal or, in the first place, realist theory 
of quantum phenomena in view of quantum correlations, such as those of the EPR type, 
which combine indeterminacy or randomness of individual quantum events and 
correlations found between these events, when the corresponding experiment is repeated 
multiple times. Interpretations of quantum phenomena and QM in the spirit of Copenhagen 
avoid these difficulties, in part, by being local alternatives to realism, because realism 
appears (the question is under debate, along with that of locality of quantum phenomena 
and QM) to imply nonlocality in view of the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems and 
related findings, on which I comment below.  
The structural nature of the nonrealism adopted here is defined by the fact that the 
effects of quantum objects and processes (which cannot be represented or even conceived 
and, hence, cannot be assigned structure) on the world we experience, specifically via 
measuring instruments affected by their interactions with quantum objects, have structure 
in the sense of the combination of indeterminacy or randomness and a correlational 
statistical order. It may be helpful to briefly consider both the difference (which is 
irreducible) between, and yet the common foundation of, “structural nonrealism” and the 
philosophical trend known as “structural realism,” a reference that is difficult to avoid once 
the heading structural nonrealism is used. Roughly, structural realism states, first, in the 
epistemic (more Kantian) version, that all we know is the structure of the relations and not 
the things themselves, and, second, in the more radical ontological version, that there are 
no “things” and that structure is all there is (Ladyman 2016). Heisenberg, in his later 
writings, speaks of “the structure of matter” and of Kant’s thing-in-itself as “a 
mathematical structure,” a concept that is in accord with to structural realism, to which 
Heisenberg appears to be closer at this point of his thinking, as against the time of his 
creation of quantum mechanics in 1925 (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 147-166, 91). 
Structural nonrealism is based, just as is structural realism, on the concept of reality 
(essentially referring to that which exists), but, in contrast to structural realism, it conceives 
of this reality as a “reality without realism,” RWR, thus defining the corresponding, RWR, 
overall epistemological view and the corresponding interpretation of QM or higher-level 
  12 
quantum theories. By this I mean that one cannot know or even conceive, now or possibly 
ever, of the ultimate character of this reality, either the reality of “things” or the reality of 
the relationships between “things,” ans thus structures, defining this reality. Although, as 
will be seen, a certain sense of “thing-ness” may apply in the case of “quantum objects,” 
or more accurately, what is idealized as such, no concept of thing or object, or relationships 
between things is applicable to this reality, any more than any other concept, ultimately 
those of reality and existence included. Accordingly, one can only speak of quantum 
objects or their thing-ness as an idealization, an idealization that is more radical than Kant’s 
conception of noumena or things-in-themselves, which, while unknowable, are still 
assumed to be thinkable (Kant 1997, p. 115). 
It follows that a “reality without realism,” which defines the ultimate (quantum) reality, 
is a reality without structure, as the concept of structure is commonly understood or, for 
that matter, in any possible understanding of this concept. Nevertheless, the nonrealism to 
be considered in this article is structural. First, it depends on mathematical structures, in 
the conventional sense, found in and defining the mathematical models (a concept close to 
that of mathematical structure), which do not have a representational role of the kind they 
do in structural realism. Secondly, and most crucially (because it would make this 
nonrealism structural even as an interpretation of quantum phenomena themselves apart 
from quantum theory), while it cannot apply to the ultimate reality at stake, the concept of 
structure in the extended sense of this article does apply at the level of quantum phenomena, 
by virtue of considering formations, quantum correlations, that combine indeterminacy or 
randomness with organization and thus structure, albeit only of a statistically correlational 
character. The mathematical structure of the mathematical formalism of QM relates to 
these correlational structures by means of correctly predicting them. It follows, however, 
that the ultimate workings of nature responsible for the emergence of these correlational 
structures are, as against structural realism, beyond our knowledge or even conception. In 
other words, while there is no way to assign properties, structure, or laws to the efficacity 
of these correlational effects, these effects themselves are organized, possess structure, 
compelling this article to extend the term structure to designate the character of quantum 
information, which combines organization and indeterminacy or randomness. 
Structural nonrealism, thus, also contains, as its part, a form of realism (pertaining to 
both things and the relationships between things), applicable at the level of effects or 
phenomena, but, as against structural realism, not at the level of the efficacity of these 
effects. Although it might appear that epistemic structural realism meets, via Kant, 
structural nonrealism halfway, this is not the case, because the reality at stake in structural 
nonrealism is more unreachable than that of Kant’s noumena or things-in-themselves. 
Besides, as just noted, while structural nonrealism allows for a certain reality and in this 
sense thingness at the ultimate level of reality, it does not allow for a realist representation 
or even specified conception of either this thingness and its constitution or the relationships 
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between any parts of this constitution. The term realism customarily refers to the possibility 
of a representation or at least conception of the reality considered, a reality of things or a 
reality of structures. Structural nonrealism denies either possibility at the ultimate level, 
and only allows for the realism of things and relationships between them, and thus 
structures, at more surface levels, such as those of structure at the level of quantum 
phenomena that define the architecture of quantum information, the architecture that is 
quantum information, as a specific form of organization of classical information. The 
existence of quantum objects, or, again, the necessity of idealization of that which exists 
thus designated, is inferred from this nonclassical architecture. They are “it from bit,” 
famously invoked by Wheeler in his visionary manifesto of quantum information theory, 
in the present view, the unknowable or even unthinkable “it,” inferred from the knowable 
“bit,” from the structures of bits of quantum information obtainable from measuring 
instruments (Wheeler 1990, p. 3). 
It follows that structural nonrealism is fundamentally, irreducibly different from 
structural realism of either type, epistemic or ontic. What provides the common 
foundations underlying both philosophical positions, even in their irreducible difference, 
is the concept of structure, apparently unavoidable in modern physics, from Galileo on, 
classical, relativistic, or quantum, and one might surmise, whatever may come beyond 
them. I would argue, however, that this irreducibility of structure in our interactions with 
nature, or in our thought in general, is defined by human nature, by our capacity for what 
we call thought, conscious and unconscious, rather than, as in (at least ontic) structural 
realism, belonging to nature apart from us. By this, given that our nature is still nature, I 
mean the nature that we assume existed before we existed and will exist when we no longer 
exist. This assumption will serve here as the definition of dead matter, the ultimate 
constitution of which cannot, in the present, RWR-type, view, be assigned structure. 
This dead matter, at some point of its history, gave rise to living matter and then to us, 
and still keeps us alive, probably not for very long on the scale of its history, from the Big 
Bang on. Life, which is much older than we are, is likely to last longer as well. For now, 
however, life, as manifested in the neurological functioning of our brains, enables us to 
think the nature and structure of quantum phenomena and to create mathematical structures 
that allows us to predict the data observed in them. It also enables us, in interpreting both 
structures, to infer the unthinkable nature, thus no longer structure, of that (designated as 
quantum objects) which gives rise to these phenomena, or to interpret this nature and this 
structure otherwise. Thus, it enables both structural nonrealism and structural realism, 
equally dependent on thinking in terms of structures, but irreducibly different in thinking 
how the structures at stake in quantum theory come about. 
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3. Physics and Philosophy of Structural Nonrealism: From Realism to Reality 
without Realism 
 
This section outlines the key concepts of structural nonrealism. Given that the relationships 
among these concepts affect how they work or even how they are ultimately defined, the 
initial definitions for some of them are bound to be provisional. A fuller sense of these 
concepts emerges in their relationships to other concepts as my discussion proceeds, even 
beyond this section. I understand a physical theory as an organized assemblage of physical, 
mathematical, and philosophical concepts, associated with physical objects or phenomena.  
It is fitting to begin with the concept of concept, rarely adequately considered in 
physical or even philosophical literature. The present definition or concept of concept 
follows G. Deleuze and F. Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). In this definition, a 
concept is not merely a generalization from particulars (which is commonly assumed to 
define concepts) or a general or abstract idea, although a concept may contain such ideas, 
specifically abstract mathematical ideas in physics, or in mathematics itself, where such 
ideas may become concepts in the present sense. (By an “idea” I refer to any mental 
construct, keeping in mind that there are more refined definitions, including those closer to 
that of concept here.) A concept is a multicomponent entity, defined by the organization 
of its components, which may be general or particular, and some of these components may 
be concepts in turn. A concept is, thus, a structure, and it is the relational organization of 
its components that defines it. This is yet another structural dimension of structural 
nonrealism, as always conceptual, and yet another reflection of the necessary role of 
structure in our thinking. 
Consider the concept of “tree,” even as it is used in our daily life. On the one hand, it 
is a single generalization of all (or most) particular trees. On the other hand, what makes 
this concept that of “tree” is the implied presence of further elements, components, or sub-
concepts, such as “branch,” “root,” “leaf,” and so forth, and the organized relationships 
among them, which gives it structure. The concept of tree acquires further features and 
components, indeed becomes a different concept, in philosophy or in science, such as 
botany and biology. 
This type of change is characteristic of the scientific use of concepts or terms derived 
from the concepts of daily life but defined otherwise, for example in quantum theory, even 
apart from obvious cases such as “charm” or “color,” used more or less whimsically and 
thus without causing any confusion, although they still exemplify this point. More 
interesting are cases when a confusion is possible and even common, as in considering 
Bohr’s concepts. As Bohr noted, in referring to his interpretation, “words like ‘phenomena’ 
and ‘observations,’ just as ‘attributes’ and ‘measurements,’ are used [in his interpretation] 
in a way hardly compatible with common language and practical definition,” in contrast to 
classical physics, which, while refining, specifically mathematically, our daily concepts, 
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such as “motion,” still retains this compatibility (Bohr 1987, v. 2, pp. 63–64). This 
compatibility is retained when these concepts are applied, as they are in Bohr or here, only 
to the observed parts of measuring instruments, which observed parts are described by 
classical physics. But, which is often missed in considering Bohr’s argumentation, it is no 
longer retained in considering quantum objects, including those parts of measuring 
instruments through which the latter interact with quantum objects and which are assumed 
to be quantum. The same situation obtains in the case of complementarity, a word that does 
not appear to have been used as a noun before Bohr (as opposed to the adjective 
“complementary”) and was introduced by Bohr to designate a new concept. As he said: “In 
the last resort an artificial word like ‘complementarity’ which does not belong to our daily 
concepts serves only briefly to remind us of the epistemological situation here encountered, 
which at least in physics is of an entirely novel character” (Bohr 1937, p. 87). In other 
words, complementarity, which I shall properly define below, is a new physical concept 
with several interrelated components. As most innovative scientific concepts, 
complementarity, when introduced, was not defined by generalization from available 
entities: it was something entirely new. It then functioned, in part, by generalizing multiple 
specific entities, such as specific complementary configurations, say, those of the position 
or the momentum measurement, always mutually exclusive at any given moment of time 
in the case of quantum phenomena. While this mutual exclusivity is an essential feature of 
complementarity, Bohr’s concept is, as will be seen, more complex and multicomponent, 
and cannot be limited to this feature. 
Simple (single-component) concepts are rare, if possible at all, as opposed to appearing 
as such because their multicomponent structure is provisionally cut off, as in the case of 
the concept of tree, as just noted. In practice, there is always a cut off in delineating a 
concept, which results from assuming some of its components to be primitive entities, 
whose structure is not specified. These primitive components could, however, be specified 
by a further delineation, which could lead to a new overall concept, containing a new set 
of primitive (unspecified) components. Such changes may result from critical 
reexaminations of such primitive, uncritically used, components or subconcepts. The 
history of a concept is a history of such successive specifications, and every concept, 
however innovative, has a history. 
The same type of process defines the history of a given theory, and just as every 
concept, every theory, however innovative, has a history, from which it emerges. By a 
theory I understand an organized assemblage of concepts, as just defined, under the 
assumption that a theory could be modified in the course of its history by modifying its 
concepts or the relationships among them. A viable physical theory must, however, relate 
to a given multiplicity of phenomena or objects, which are customarily assumed to form 
the reality considered by this theory. 
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I refer to both phenomena and objects, because, as Kant realized, they are not the same 
even in classical mechanics, which deals with individual classical objects or sufficiently 
small classical systems. However, as Kant realized as well, when a direct observation is 
possible, classical objects, say, planets moving around the Sun, and our phenomenal 
representation of them could be treated as the same for all practical purposes, because our 
observational interference with their behavior could, at least in principle, be neglected or 
compensated for, thus allowing us, in principle, to consider this behavior independently. 
Indeed, this was assumed to be possible in the case of all classical physical objects, even 
when they were not or even could not be observed, as in the case of atoms or molecules in 
the kinetic theory of gases in the nineteenth century. Quantum phenomena put this 
assumption into question. Quantum phenomena themselves, defined by the effects of the 
interactions between quantum objects and measuring instruments, are observable in the 
same way as are classical physical objects and could be treated as such, as classical objects. 
By contrast, the “uncontrollable” nature of these interactions precludes any observation or, 
at least in nonrealist, RWR-type, interpretations, even rigorous inferential reconstitution of 
the independent nature and space-time behavior of quantum objects (Bohr 1935, pp. 697, 
700). Such a reconstitution is, in Bohr’s words, “in principle excluded” (Bohr 1987, v. 2, 
p. 62). Nobody has ever observed, at least thus far, an electron or photon as such, in motion 
or at rest, to the degree that such a concept, as opposed to a change of a state of an electron 
or photon, ultimately applies to them, or any quantum objects, qua quantum objects, no 
matter how large. (Photons, of course, only exist in motion.) It is only possible to observe 
traces, such as spots on photographic plates, left by their interactions with measuring 
instruments. The present interpretation, in which quantum objects and processes are 
beyond conception (rather than only representation), makes this difference more radical 
than that defined by Kant, for whom objects, as noumena or things-in-themselves, are only 
beyond knowledge and representation but not beyond conception (Kant 1997, p. 115). As 
will be seen below, Kant gives to the faculty he calls Reason [Vernunft] the power to claim 
that its thinking concerning noumena or things-in-themselves corresponds to what is in fact 
true, although some of such truths may not actually represent, at least not completely, the 
nature of these truths. 
The history of a theory is accompanied and shaped by the history of its interpretations, 
which are essential (if sometimes implicit) for establishing the relationships between a 
theory and the phenomena or objects it considers. The history of QM, in particular, has 
been shaped by a seemingly uncontainable proliferation of, sometimes conflicting, 
interpretations.7 In fact, a theory always involves, however implicitly, an interpretation, for 
                                                        
7 It is not possible to survey these interpretations here. Each rubric on by now a long list (e.g., the 
Copenhagen, the many-worlds, consistent-histories, modal, relational, transcendental-pragmatist, 
and so forth) contains different versions. The literature dealing with each interpretation is immense. 
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example and, in modern physics, in particular, in defining how the mathematics used by a 
theory works in establishing these relationships, which is customarily done by means of 
mathematical models. 
I define a mathematical model as a mathematical structure or a set of mathematical 
structures that enables such relationships.8 If a mathematical model consists of a single 
mathematical structure, this model is pretty much equivalent to this structure, as reflected 
in the concept of model in mathematics itself, roughly, a collection, usually, a set, of 
abstract mathematical objects and relationships among them that satisfy given axioms and 
rules of procedure. In physics, these relations between a model and the objects or 
phenomena considered may be representational, which makes them realist, and derive their 
predictive capacity from their representational nature, as in the case of models used in 
classical mechanics or relativity; or they may be strictly predictive, without being 
representational, as in QM in nonrealist interpretations, where our predictions are, in 
general, probabilistic or statistical in character. As just noted, a theory always involves an 
interpretation of itself and of the model or models it uses, in the latter case especially by 
establishing the way in which these models relate to the phenomena or objects considered. 
Rigorously, a different interpretation of a given mathematical model defines a different 
theory, in the present definition of theory. For simplicity, however, I shall speak of the 
corresponding interpretation of the theory itself, containing a given mathematical model, 
interpreted by this theory, say, of an interpretation of QM, in considering an interpretation 
of its mathematical formalism. 
I shall now define a concept of reality, which is very general, and, as such, equally 
applies to the concepts of reality found in both structural realism and structural nonrealism. 
Indeed, it arguably applies to most, even if not all (which would be impossible), currently 
available versions of realism and nonrealism, scientific or philosophical. Each version of 
either would give this concept further features, most especially, by assuming this reality to 
be representable or at least conceivable in realism and as being beyond representation, or 
as here, even beyond conception, in nonrealism. By reality I refer to that which exists or is 
assumed to exist, without making any claim concerning the character of this existence, the 
                                                        
Standard reference sources, such as Wikipedia (“Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics”) lists most 
common rubrics. 
8 As other major concepts discussed here, the concept of a mathematical model has a long history, 
which is also a history of diverse and often diverging definitions, and literature on the subject is 
extensive. It is not my aim to discuss the subject as such or engage with this literature, which would 
be difficult within the scope of this article. It is also not necessary. The present concept of a model, 
while relatively open, is internally consistent and is sufficient to accommodate those models that I 
shall consider. See (Frigg and Hartmann 2012), which addresses the subject on lines of analytic 
philosophy, and (Plotnitsky 2016), which offers a more comprehensive analysis of the concept of 
mathematical model used here. 
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type of claim that defines realism. I understand existence as a capacity to have effects on 
the world with which we interact and that, because it exists, has such effects upon itself, 
effects that need not have classical causes. 
In physics, the primary reality considered is that of nature or matter, including that of 
fields or that to which the concept of field, classical or quantum, would relate, keeping in 
mind that the concept of quantum field in QFT is, beginning with its definition, a subject 
of much debate and controversy.9 This or any other idea of nature or matter is still a product 
of thought, the reality of thought, which reality, however, is customarily assumed to be a 
product of the material processes in the brain, and thus of matter. “Matter” is, generally, a 
narrower concept than “nature,” although when at stake is, as for the most part in this 
article, the ultimate level of the material constitution of nature, both concepts merge. 
Matter is commonly, but not always (although exceptions are rare), assumed to exist 
independently of our interaction with it, and to have existed when we did not exist and to 
continue to exist when we will no longer exist, an assumption that may, as noted, be seen 
as defining the independent existence of matter. 
This assumption is upheld in nonrealist interpretations of QM and in structural 
nonrealism, but in the absence of a representation or even conception of the character of 
this existence, for example, as either discrete or continuous. (It is not possible to conceive 
of an elemental entity that is both: a composite entity can have both elements.) In such 
interpretations, discreteness only pertains to quantum phenomena, observed in measuring 
instruments, and continuity has no physical significance at all. It is only found in the 
formalism of QM, which, while continuous in its mathematical character, relates to discrete 
quantum phenomena by predicting, with the help of rules, such as Born’s rule, added to 
this formalism, the probabilities or statistics of the occurrence of quantum events. 
Physical theories prior to quantum theory have been, and have been designed to be, 
realist theories, usually representational realist theories. Such theories aim to represent, 
usually (classically) causally, the corresponding objects and their behavior by 
mathematical models, assumed to idealize how nature works, an assumption sometimes 
referred to as “scientific realism,” commonly under a broader assumption that a scientific 
theory or a set of scientific theories can, at least ideally, represent nature, hopefully also in 
its ultimate constitution. Thus, classical mechanics (used in dealing with elemental 
individual objects and some small classical systems), classical statistical mechanics (used 
in dealing, statistically, with large classical systems, whose individual constituents are 
assumed to be described by classical mechanics), or chaos theory (used in dealing with 
classical systems that exhibit a highly nonlinear behavior) are all realist theories. I shall be 
primarily concerned, apart from quantum theory, with these types of realist theories and 
                                                        
9 I considered QFT in detail in (Plotnitsky 2016), where quantum fields are defined in terms of 
“reality without realism,” although not within the framework of structural nonrealism.  
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the corresponding models.10 In its broad philosophical, realism, representational or 
nonrepresentational (defined below), need not be scientific and, specifically, mathematical. 
It could also, for example, in certain biological theories, be scientific without being 
mathematical, but not without being conceptual. 
This irreducibility of conceptual mediation in scientific thinking, especially thinking 
concerning the nature of reality, was acutely realized by Einstein. He saw the practice of 
theoretical physics as that of the invention of new concepts, through which and, he insisted, 
only through which one can approach reality. He argued that a viable realist representation 
of physical reality could only be achieved by means of conceptual construction, rather than 
by means of observable facts themselves, a view that he saw as the empiricist 
“philosophical prejudice,” exemplified by E. Mach’s positivist philosophy. He added: 
“Such a misconception is possible because one does not easily become aware of the free 
choice of such concepts, which, through success and long usage, appear to be immediately 
connected with the empirical material” (Einstein 1949, p. 47). As Einstein was undoubtedly 
aware, such a choice is never entirely free, which is to say, is never entirely a choice. It 
might be more precise to speak of one’s decision concerning which concepts to adopt. 
However, especially when to comes to major discoveries, such a decision may involve 
enough freedom to justify Einstein’s claim. On the other hand, he is entirely correct in 
arguing for the necessity of concepts in order to understand construct the structure of 
reality, even if, as in nonrealist, RWR-type, views, no such structure could be assigned to 
reality. One still needs concepts, such as that of structure to rigorously establish this 
impossibility, as an inference from the structure of information observed in measuring 
devices, impacted by quantum objects, or, again, what is so inferred, as defining this reality 
beyond representation or conception, including that of structure. 
In his Physics and Philosophy, an important book invoked at several junctures in this 
article, Heisenberg used this type of emphasis on the role of concepts in theoretical physics 
                                                        
10 Their status as realist could of course be questioned, specifically on Kantian lines. For example, 
to what degree do the spacetimes of relativity correspond to the ultimate constitution of nature? How 
realist is such a representation, even as an idealization, or in the first place, the concept of space-
time itself, as opposed to serving as a mathematical tool for correct predictions, in this case, exact 
rather than probabilistic, as against quantum theory? These questions could also be posed in the case 
of special relativity, or even classical mechanics, in which case, as indicated earlier, the 
representational idealizations used are more in accord with our phenomenal experience, which is 
only partially the case in relativity. For some of these complexities in relativity, see (Butterfield and 
Isham 2001). However, these cases still allow for viable idealized realist and causal, indeed 
deterministic, models. This appears to be much more difficult, if possible at all, in quantum theory 
(QM, QFT, or QTFD), which, at least thus far, has to be irreducibly probabilistic on experimental 
grounds even in considering elemental individual quantum objects and processes. This excludes a 
deterministic model, although it does not exclude a causal or, in the first place, realist model.  
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to argue that “the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory” was not positivistic, in 
which he followed Einstein, with whom he had important exchanges concerning the subject 
and the relationships between observation and theory in physics, following Heisenberg’s 
invention of quantum mechanics (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 45-46; Heisenberg 1989, p. 30; 
Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 42-44). The phrase “the elements of reality” used by Heisenberg in 
the passage I am about to cite is, too, borrowed from Einstein, who often used it, most 
famously in the EPR paper (Einstein et al 1935, p. 138). Heisenberg says: “The 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is in no way positivistic. For, whereas 
positivism is based on the sensual perceptions of the observer as the elements of reality, 
the Copenhagen interpretation regards things and processes which are describable in terms 
of classical concepts, i.e., the actual, as the foundations of any physics interpretation” 
(Heisenberg 1962, p. 145). “The actual” here refers, following Bohr, to what is observed 
in measuring instruments. I shall return to the role (often misunderstood) of classical 
concepts in Bohr’s argumentation later. My main point at the moment is the fundamental 
role of concepts in theoretical physics. Besides, QM involved plenty of concepts, physical, 
such as complementarity, and mathematical, such as noncommuting operator variables, 
that are not classical. While in the spirit of Copenhagen, “the Copenhagen interpretation” 
invoked here and discussed in Heisenberg’s book is shaped by a mixture of Heisenberg’s 
own and Bohr’s views, from which Heisenberg departs at certain points, in particular, in 
his understanding of complementarity and in introducing the concept of “potentiality” or 
“potentia,” not found in Bohr. Heisenberg, at this stage, also appears to have inclined to 
believe in the capacity of mathematics to represent the ultimate structure of matter, a belief 
not shared by Bohr either. Bohr would, however, have agreed that his understanding of the 
quantum-mechanical situation was “in no way positivistic,” in part for the reasons stated 
by Heisenberg. 
Indeed, Bohr’s interpretation was in fact concerned, even primarily concerned with 
quantum objects, even though they could not be observed as such, but only inferred from 
their effects on measuring instruments. It is not us but nature that, in its interaction with us, 
via our experimental technology (which includes our bodies that observe these effects but 
which of course consists of so much more) that is responsible for these effects, even though 
we cannot know or possibly even conceive how these effects come about. It is true that we, 
our bodies, and out technology are nature, too. But neither are sufficient in themselves to 
produce these effects, which require the quantum constitution of nature apart from us and 
our technology, or, again, that which compels us to speak of this constitution, assuming 
that even the term “constitution” applies.  
One could also define another type of realism, which is not representational. This 
realism encompasses theories that would presuppose an independent structure of reality 
governing the behavior of the ultimate objects these theories consider, while allowing that 
this architecture cannot be represented, even ideally, either at a given moment in history or 
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perhaps ever, but if so, only due to practical limitations. In the first eventuality, a theory 
that is merely predictive may be accepted for lack of a realist alternative, but under the 
assumption or with the hope that a future theory will do better, in particular by virtue of 
being a realist theory of the representational type. Einstein adopted this view in considering 
QM, which he expected to be eventually replaced by a (representational) realist theory, 
ideally, a field theory of a classical-like type. Einstein followed this program, first, very 
successfully, in general relativity and then, without much success, in trying to unify gravity 
and electromagnetism. Even in the second eventuality, however, reality is customarily 
conceived on realist models of classical physics, possibly adjusting them to accommodate 
new phenomena and new concepts, as happened in the case of electromagnetism and the 
(classical) concept of field in the nineteenth century. 
What unites both types of realism and thus defines realism more generally is the 
assumption that the ultimate constitution of nature possesses properties, beginning with 
that of the thingness of things, and the structured relationships among them, or (as in 
structural realism) just structures, that may be either (a) known in one degree or another 
and, hence, represented, at least ideally, by a theory or model, or (b) unknown or even 
unknowable. The difference between (a) and (b) is that between the two types of realism 
just described, representational and nonrepresentational. 
The assumption of realism of either type is abandoned or even precluded in nonrealist, 
RWR-type, interpretations of quantum phenomena and QM, beginning with that of Bohr. 
In such interpretations, the mathematical model of QM, defined by its mathematical 
formalism, becomes a strictly probabilistically or statistically predictive model, while 
suspending or even precluding a representation and possibly a conception of quantum-level 
reality and (in the second eventuality, as an immediate consequence) an assumption that 
this reality is causal. Although realist interpretations of the quantum-mechanical formalism 
have been offered, its representational capacities and the effectiveness of such 
interpretations, or (it would be surprising otherwise) conversely, the effectiveness of 
nonrealist interpretations, have been and continue to be intensely debated.11 The 
probabilistic or statistical character of quantum predictions must, however, be maintained 
by realist interpretations of these theories or alternative theories (such as Bohmian 
mechanics), to accord with what is observed in quantum experiments, where only 
                                                        
11 While primarily concerned with nonrealism, the present argument does not aim to deny realism, 
still a generally preferred philosophical view. One must also be mindful of additional complexities. 
One might, for example, argue against a realist interpretation of the wave function, as a continuous 
entity, and maintain a realist view of QM, as referring to a discrete ultimate ontology (Rovelli 2016). 
In the present view, no ontology, either continuous or discontinuous, can again be assigned at the 
ultimate level of reality. One could assign ontology, ultimately discrete, at the level of quantum 
phenomena, defined by what is observed in measuring instruments, and probabilistically predicted 
by means of QM, including the wave function.  
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probabilistic or statistical predictions are possible. This is because the repetition of 
identically prepared experiments in general leads to different outcomes, and, unlike in 
classical physics, this difference cannot be diminished beyond the limit defined by Planck’s 
constant, h, by improving the capacity of our measuring instruments, as manifested in the 
uncertainty relations, which would apply even if we had perfect instruments. 
Nonrealist interpretations do, again, assume the concept of reality, as that which is 
assumed to exist, without, in contrast to realist theories, making any claims concerning the 
character of this existence, which, in terms adopted here, makes this concept of reality that 
of “reality without realism” (Plotnitsky 2016, Plotnitsky and Khrennikov 2015).12 
Physically, an interpretation of this kind is an interpretation of quantum phenomena and 
QM, corresponding to a certain overall view in physics and philosophy—the RWR 
interpretation and the RWR view. Such an interpretation places quantum objects and 
processes beyond representation, which I shall term “the weak RWR view,” or beyond 
conception, beyond the reach of thought altogether, which I shall term “the strong RWR 
view,” adopted here. (When either form of the RWR view applies, I shall just refer to the 
RWR view, the RWR-type interpretation, and so forth.) The existence of quantum objects 
or something that leads to this idealization is inferred from the totality of effects they have 
on our world, specifically on experimental technology.13 Nothing, however, could be said, 
or, again, in the strong RWR view, even thought, concerning what happens between 
quantum experiments. 
As Heisenberg observed, it may be said that something does “happen,” say, in an 
“atom,” between our observations, as manifested in changes we observed in our 
instruments, and thus independently of us, but only insofar as we keep in mind the 
provisional nature of such words or concepts as “happen” or “atom,” which are ultimately 
inapplicable in this case, any more than any other human words or concepts. Besides, that 
such a change was due to the interaction with the same quantum object cannot be 
guaranteed in any single experiments; it can only be ascertained statistically when the same 
experiments is repeated many times. According to Heisenberg: 
 
There is no description of what happens to the system between the initial observation and 
the next measurement. …The demand to “describe what happens” in the quantum-
theoretical process between two successive observations is a contradiction in adjecto, since 
the word “describe” [or “represent”] refers to the use of classical concepts, while these 
                                                        
12 One could, in principle, see the claim concerning merely the existence or reality of something to 
which a theory can relate without representing or even conceiving of it as a form of realism. This 
use of the term realism is sometimes found in advocating interpretations of QM that are nonrealist 
in the present sense. However, placing “reality” outside “realism” is advantageous, especially in the 
context of this article.  
13 For an analysis of the concept of quantum objects from a realist perspective, see (Jaeger 2015). 
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concepts cannot be applied in the space between the observations; they can only be applied 
at the points of observation. (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 47, 145) 
 
The same, it follows, must apply to the word “happen” or any word we use, and we must 
use words and concepts associated to them, even when we try to restrict ourselves to 
mathematics as much as possible. There can be no physics without language, but quantum 
physics imposes new limitations on using it. Heisenberg adds later in the book: “But the 
problem of language is really serious. We wish to speak in some way about the structure 
of the atoms and not only about ‘facts’—the latter being, for instance, the black spots on a 
photographic plate or the water droplets in a cloud chamber. But we cannot speak about 
the atoms in ordinary language” (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 178-179). Nor, by the same token, 
can we use, in referring to the atoms, ordinary concepts, from which our language is not 
dissociable, or for that matter any concepts, physical or philosophical. 
On the other hand, as Heisenberg noted already in his Chicago lectures of 1929, 
mathematics, and one might add, for the reasons explained below, algebra in particular, is, 
“fortunately,” free from the limitations of language, fortunately because, as Heisenberg 
stressed there, otherwise quantum mechanics would not be possible (Heisenberg 1930, p. 
11). Mathematics also allows to circumvent the limits our phenomenal, representational 
intuition, also involving visualization, sometimes used, including by Bohr, to translate the 
German word for intuition, Anschaulichkeit. “Visualization” and its avatars, such as 
“pictorial visualization,” is often invoked by Bohr, by way of this translation, in 
considering quantum objects and behavior, as being beyond our capacity to phenomenally 
represent them (e.g., Bohr 1987, v.1, pp. 51, 98-100, 108, v. 2, p. 59). It clear, however, 
that he sees quantum objects and processes are being beyond any representation, even if 
not, as here, conception, including, again, in contrast to Heisenberg, a mathematical one. 
In any event, in Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s view alike (on this point Heisenberg was in 
agreement with and in fact followed Bohr [Heisenberg 1930, p. 11]), our phenomenal 
intuition and, thus, concepts that it can actually form in physics, appear to be classical and, 
quite possibly, when dealing with change, classically causal. For, according to L. 
Wittgenstein, we might not be able to conceive of a process that is not causal (Wittgenstein 
1924, p. 175). Certain concepts, such as complementarity, can help us to cope with these 
difficulties, but they will not enable us to entirely avoid them. It is mathematics that helps 
us most. 
As free from these limitations of language and ordinary, or even philosophical 
intuition, mathematics could, in principle, be assumed to represent the structure of the 
atoms, as Heisenberg eventually came to believe, certainly by the time of the statement just 
cited in Physics and Philosophy, which gives mathematics at least some capacity to do so, 
on lines close to those of structural realism. On the other hand, as is clear from his 
statements and correspondence, cited in the next section, at the time of his discovery of 
quantum mechanics, he appears to have seen mathematics’ freedom from these limitations 
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of language and ordinary, while crucial for quantum mechanics and even making its 
invention possible, in terms its probabilistically predictive rather than representational 
capacity.  Bohr adopted this view following Heisenberg’s discovery of quantum mechanics 
and never relinquished it. It is not exactly clear when this change in Heisenberg’s view, 
progressively more noticeable in his publications, occurred. He might have started to move 
toward this view already by the time of his Chicago lectures and even around at the time 
of his discovery of the uncertainty relations in 1927, following his exchange with Einstein, 
mentioned above, concerning the relationships between observation and theory in physics 
(e.g., Heisenberg 1962, pp. 45-46; Heisenberg 1989, p. 30, Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 42-44). In 
his several recollection of this exchange and his thinking leading to his discovery of the 
uncertainty relations, Heisenberg referred to the following perspective, which, he said, was 
important in this discovery: “Instead of asking: How can one in the known mathematical 
scheme express a given experimental situation? the other question was put: Is it true, 
perhaps that only such experimental situations can arise in nature as can be expressed in 
the mathematical formalism” (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 44-45; Heisenberg 1989, p. 30; 
emphasis added). Apart from the role of this view in Heisenberg’s discovery of the 
uncertainty relations (which is a separate topic), this assumption would imply that the 
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, represents, “expresses,” at least ideally, 
the quantum workings of nature, rather than merely enables us to predict the effects of the 
interactions between quantum objects and measuring instruments, as Heisenberg thought 
at the time of his discovery of quantum mechanics.  
It may be added in this connection, that the following view has been advanced, 
beginning with both Dirac and von Neumann (Dirac 1930; von Neumann 1932), which 
were influential in shaping and promoting this view, sometimes even characterized as “the 
Copenhagen interpretation.” According to this view, the mathematical formalism of QM 
represents quantum processes between quantum experiments, moreover causally, with 
randomness and thus the recourse to probability only brought in by measurement. At least, 
this formalism would represent them mathematically, that is, in the absence of a physical 
conception of these processes, although, as noted, causality would entail a partial 
conception of them. In Heisenberg’s view, again, at the time of his discovery of QM, or 
that of Bohr, in most of his thinking concerning the subject, the quantum-mechanical 
formalism does not represent anything, either between or during measurements; it only 
predicts, probabilistically or statistically, what could happen in certain possible 
experiments on the basis of the data obtained in certain other, previously performed, 
experiments.14 
                                                        
14 I add the emphasized qualification, because Bohr briefly and still ambivalently entertained this 
type of view in his early thinking (in 1926-1927) concerning QM and complementarity, which may 
be one of the reasons why this view is sometimes presented as “the Copenhagen interpretation.” 
Bohr, however, quickly abandoned this view, in part under an impact of his initial exchanges with 
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The present, strong, form of the RWR view is manifestly more radical than that of 
Kant’s noumena or things-in-themselves, vis-à-vis phenomena or appearances formed in 
our minds. According to Kant, while noumena are unknowable, they are still in principle 
conceivable, especially by what he calls “Reason” [Vernunft], a higher faculty than 
“Understanding” [Verstand], which only concerns phenomena (Kant 1997, p. 115, 
Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 19-21). As noted above, the Kantian Reason is even able to form true 
conceptions of the ultimate nature of reality (of things-in-themselves). Kant’s scheme is, 
thus, realist in the present definition: it conforms at least to realism of a nonrepresentational 
type, and in the case of Reason sometimes even of a representational type, although 
Reason’s claims concerning the noumenal reality may not entail a specific representation 
or even a definite conception of it, which may be impossible. Thus, the claim of the 
existence of God is true, according to Kant, but, apart from viewing God as a supreme 
agency of creation, little, if anything, could be known or thought by us about the ultimate 
nature of this existence, which led Kant to his criticism of all claims to the effect (Kant 
1997). Kant’s God is the God of metaphysics, not the (personal) God of Religion (Badiou 
2007, pp. 21-32). 
It might indeed appear that the present (RWR) view of matter is similar to Kant’s or 
related views of the divine. This is not the case, however, because in the present or most 
other RWR-type views, no conception of divine or divine like creation can be applied to 
matter (except metaphorically), any more than any other property. In this type of view, 
matter has effects, but, given the character of some of these effects, manifested in quantum 
phenomena, the ultimate efficacity of these effects cannot be represented in terms of any 
properties or even concepts, for example, that of some supreme being. It is clear that any 
such concept, even that of God as a mathematician, is not only classical but also 
anthropocentric, something that, as Bohr warned on many occasions, one should be 
cautious in applying to the ultimate constitution of nature. Einstein’s famous “God does 
not play dice” would be one example here, except that Einstein clearly uses it 
metaphorically (meaning nature), a brilliant rhetorical move that immortalized the 
statement.15 
It might be added that the weak RWR view, at least in Bohr’s version of it, is still 
different from that of Kant. For, there is, in Bohr’s view, no power, such as that of the 
Kantian Reason, that would allow us to have such a conception at the noumenal level (the 
                                                        
Einstein concerning the subject (Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 66-68, 124-131, 159). By contrast, as just 
indicated, Heisenberg appears to have started around the same time and also under an impact of his 
exchanges with Einstein’s ideas, to move toward a certain mathematical form realism, eventually 
on the lines of structural realism. Einstein, while stressing the defining significance of mathematics 
in forming physical concepts, believed that our physical concepts should, as physical (rather than 
only mathematical) concepts, have power to approximate the ultimate nature of reality. 
15 For a further discussion of this point, see (Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 65-66). 
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level of things-in-themselves), independently of a theory dealing with the observed 
phenomena, in this case, quantum theory and quantum phenomena. This philosophical 
position was also adopted by Heisenberg, expressly against Kant (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 
86-92). In the present, strong RWR, view, as things stand now, such as conception is, again, 
strictly precluded. 
The strong RWR view is, then, beyond all realism (as defined here), by virtue of 
placing the ultimate nature of reality, such as that of quantum objects and processes, 
beyond conception, whether such a conception be philosophical, physical, or mathematical. 
As noted earlier, a mathematical conception may be divorced from any physical or 
philosophical conceptuality. This makes such words as “ultimate nature,” or “objects,” 
“process,” and “quantum,” or even “reality” or “existence,” provisional and ultimately 
inapplicable as well, insofar as our thinking assigns, as it perhaps bound to do (at least 
unconsciously) any specific representational concepts to them. “Reality” functions as a 
name without a concept. It designates something that is beyond thought but that, 
nevertheless, has manifested effects upon the world with which we interact by means of 
our bodies and technologies. But then, our bodies could be seen as technologies as well, 
including those of perception and thought, but far from only them. The history of physics 
has always been dependent on the mechanical technologies of our bodies, and it still is, 
despite the nearly unimaginable complexities of our experimental technologies, such as 
that of the present-day accelerators, and the ubiquitous role digital technologies play in 
present-day experimental and theoretical physics. Our bodies are still there to do physics, 
which is not possible without them, unless one ascribes (and some do) the capacity of doing 
physics to computers or (this happens as well) to nature itself. 
In the strong RWR view, the ultimate reality at stake is not merely something that, 
while as yet unthought, might eventually be thought, be conceived of in any form, for 
example, by assuming that it has a structure even without specifying this structure. Instead, 
this reality is seen as that which cannot ever be reached by thought. If a conception of this 
reality, in quantum theory, the physical or mathematical, of the nature of quantum objects 
and processes is assumed to be formed (as some claim is the case even now), one reverts 
to realism, at least, of a nonrepresentational type, or if this conception is mathematical 
(with or without a physical conception this mathematics represents) likely of a 
representational type. I shall further comment on this point below. 
As indicated earlier, it is not clear whether Bohr or Heisenberg held the strong RWR 
or the weak for of the RWR view. While the weak RWR view is philosophically different, 
it still allows one to see quantum theory as nonrealist, even as against nonrepresentational 
realism, given that, as things stand now, no concept of the ultimate (quantum) reality 
considered can be unambiguously used in quantum theory. Bohr and Heisenberg (in his 
earlier thinking, influenced by Bohr) might, however, have assumed the strong RWR view, 
because of their emphasis on the lack of causality in quantum processes, if one agrees with 
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Wittgenstein’s contention, mentioned earlier, that we cannot conceive of processes that are 
not causal (Wittgenstein 1924, p. 175). It is, however, not clear either whether either Bohr 
or Heisenberg thought this to be the case. 
As explained earlier, assuming this to be the case does not prevent the possibility that 
a mathematical model would represent quantum behavior, perhaps noncausally, because a 
mathematical conception can do so in the absence of a physical conception corresponding 
to this mathematical conception, thus, entailing a strictly mathematical ontology of the 
ultimate physical reality, even if its physical character may not be entirely known or is not 
known at all, which is not an uncommon view, found, for example, in structural realism or 
in Heisenberg’s later thinking. A form of realism advocated by Heisenberg in his later 
works still precludes any form of representational language or concepts, apart from 
mathematical ones (Heisenberg 1962, pp. 145, 167-186). For instance, this reality may be 
claimed to be invariant under a symmetry group, although all of the specifics may not be 
fully known, a view, again, found in Heisenberg’s later writings. In the present view, the 
symmetry groups of quantum theory are still seen only as part of the probabilistically 
predictive mechanism of quantum theory, although symmetries may, of course, apply 
representationally at macro levels. Bohr’s position (or, again, that of Heisenberg at earlier 
stages of his thinking about quantum theory) was defined by the view that a representation 
or even an application of any available or even possible conception, philosophical, 
physical, or mathematical, to quantum level reality is, in his words, “in principle excluded,” 
as things stands now (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 62).16 
 “As things stand now” is, again, a crucial qualification, equally applicable to the strong 
RWR view, even though it might appear otherwise, because this view precludes any 
conception of reality not only now but also ever, by placing it beyond thought altogether. 
Nevertheless, the qualification “as things stand now” still applies. This is because a return 
to realism is possible, either on experimental or theoretical grounds. Thus, quantum theory, 
as currently constituted (QM, QFT, and QTFD), may be replaced by an alternative theory 
that allows for or requires a realist interpretation, or the RWR-type interpretations, either 
of the weak or the strong RWR type, may become obsolete, with quantum theory in place 
in its present form. There is, however, a difference in how this change would affect the 
weak vs. the strong RWR view, which is as follows. In the case of the weak RWR view, 
the mathematics of quantum theory would be brought into an unambiguous agreement with 
one or another conception of reality, possibly by way of representing this reality, on the 
line of Einstein’s ideal of a fundamental physical theory and fulfilling his hope. In the case 
of the strong RWR view, the very conception of reality beyond thought would no longer 
                                                        
16 As noted above (note 14), Bohr briefly entertained the idea that the ultimate nature of quantum 
reality could be represented by the mathematical formalism of QM, and moreover causally, in which 
case, it would be at least partially conceivable as well. Bohr, again, quickly abandoned the idea. 
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be applicable to quantum theory. (This conception may still be entertained philosophically 
or apply elsewhere.) As things stand now, however, either view is interpretively possible, 
without affecting the physics or mathematics involved; and it is also possible that the RWR 
view, in either weak or strong version, will remain part of our future fundamental theories, 
as the development of QFT theory might indicate. QFT has been open to the RWR-type 
view and the corresponding interpretation from its inception with Dirac until now and was 
used, specifically by Bohr, in support of this view (e.g., Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 64; Plotnitsky 
2016, pp. 207-246). The RWR view, in either version, does not preclude the development 
of new fundamental theories, for example, that of quantum gravity. It only changes the 
nature of these theories and, in this first place, the nature of our thinking in physics and 
beyond by making the unrepresentable and, in the strong RWR view, the unthinkable an 
irreducible part of thought. 
I now turn to the question of causality. As noted, RWR-type interpretations make the 
absence of classical causality nearly automatic. This absence is stricly automatic if one 
adopts the strong RWR view, which places the ultimate nature of reality beyond 
conception, because the assumption that the ultimate nature of reality is classically causal 
would imply at least a partial conception of this reality. However, even if one adopts the 
weak RWR view, which only precludes a representation of this reality, classical causality 
is still difficult to maintain in considering quantum phenomena. This is because to do so 
one requires a degree of representation, analogous to that found in classical physics, that 
appears to be prevented, in particular, by the uncertainty relations (which are independent 
of QM, although fully consistent with it). Schrödinger aptly expressed this difficulty, while 
disparaging the spirit of Copenhagen as “the doctrine born of distress,” in his cat-paradox 
paper: “if a classical state does not exist at any moment, it can hardly change causally,” 
where a classical state is defined by the ideally definite position and the definite momentum 
of an object at any moment of time (Schrödinger 1935a, p. 154). According to Bohr (who 
here refers by causality to what I call “classical causality”): 
 
The unrestricted applicability of the causal mode of description to physical phenomena has 
hardly been seriously questioned until Planck’s discovery of the quantum of action, which 
disclosed a novel feature of atomicity in the laws of nature supplementing in such 
unsuspected manner the old doctrine of the limited divisibility of matter. Before this 
discovery statistical methods were of course extensively used in atomic theory but merely 
as a practical means of dealing with the complicated mechanical problems met with in the 
attempt at tracing the ordinary properties of matter back to the behaviour of assemblies of 
immense numbers of atoms. It is true that the very formulation of the laws of 
thermodynamics involves an essential renunciation of the complete mechanical description 
of such assemblies and thereby exhibits a certain formal resemblance with typical problems 
of quantum theory. So far there was, however, no question of any limitation in the 
possibility of carrying out in principle such a complete description…. Due to the essentially 
statistical character of the thermodynamical problems which led to the discovery of the 
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quantum of action, it was also not to begin with realized, that the insufficiency of the laws 
of classical mechanics and electrodynamics in dealing with atomic problems, disclosed by 
this discovery, implies a shortcoming of the causality ideal itself. (Bohr 1938, pp. 94–95) 
 
Elsewhere, Bohr notes: “[E]ven in the great epoch of critical [i.e., post-Kantian] philosophy 
in the former century, there was only a question to what extent a priori arguments could be 
given for the adequacy of space-time coordination and causal connection of experience, 
but never a question of rational generalizations [such as complementarity] or inherent 
limitations of such categories of human thinking” (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 65). By contrast, as 
he argues in the same article, “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in 
Atomic Physics”: “it is most important to realize that the recourse to probability laws under 
such circumstances is essentially different in aim from the familiar application of statistical 
considerations as practical means of accounting for the properties of mechanical systems 
of great structural complexity. In fact, in quantum physics we are presented not with 
intricacies of this kind, but with the inability of the classical frame of concepts to comprise 
the peculiar feature[s] of the elementary [quantum] processes” (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 34). 
While “the classical frame of concepts” may refer here to those of classical physics, Bohr 
may also be here closer to the strong RWR view. For, at this stage in his thinking about 
quantum theory (in 1940s), he argues that all concepts (“object,” “process,” and 
“quantum,” among them) we can form are essentially classical and, as such, 
representational and, as noted above, via Wittgenstein, possibly even causal in nature, by 
virtue of our inability to conceive a process that is not causal (Wittgenstein 1924, p. 175). 
It is also in this article that Bohr, in the statement partly cited earlier, responds to Einstein’s 
discontent with the nonrealist epistemology of QM and its irreducibly probabilistic or 
statistical nature. Einstein appears to have in mind something like the weak RWR 
interpretation, to which, in his view, QM lent itself, while that was, for Einstein, not 
necessarily the case for quantum phenomena themselves, which he saw as, in principle, 
open to a more classical treatment. Bohr says: “Even if such an attitude [that of Einstein] 
might seem balanced in itself, it nevertheless implies a rejection of the whole 
argumentation exposed in the preceding [essentially Bohr’s nonrealist interpretation, now 
closer to the present, strong, RWR view], that, in quantum mechanics, we are not dealing 
with an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis of atomic phenomena, but with 
a recognition that such an analysis is in principle excluded” (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 62; 
emphasis on “rejection” added).  This is a rejection, a rejection based on a philosophical 
view and not a counterargument. Einstein admitted as much because he saw Bohr’s 
argumentation or the situation it reflected “as logically possible without contradiction, 
but …so contrary to [his] scientific instinct that [he could not] forego the search for a more 
complete conception” (Einstein 1936, p. 349; Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 62; emphasis added). By 
a more complete conception he clearly meant a realist theory that would also avoid 
probability in considering elementary individual processes and events. 
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Heisenberg, too, argued that “the statistical nature of the laws of microscopic 
[quantum] physics cannot be avoided, since any knowledge of the ‘actual’ is—because of 
the quantum-theoretical laws—by its very nature an incomplete knowledge” (Heisenberg 
1962, p. 145). I would add that this knowledge, even as concerns the “actual” (which, again, 
refers here to what is observed in measuring instruments), is only incomplete insofar as it 
cannot conform to the ideal of completeness found in classical physics, where it is 
accompanied by classical causality. This “incompleteness” arises because of the 
uncertainty relations (thus correlative to the statistical nature of quantum predictions), 
which apply to the actual, to the variables registered in measuring instruments and, as will 
be seen below, strictly speaking only to these variables. Rigorously speaking, this 
knowledge is as complete as nature allows our knowledge of quantum phenomena to be, 
as things stand now. Of course, in RWR-type interpretations, our knowledge concerning 
quantum objects themselves and their independent behavior is not merely incomplete but 
is in fact impossible. There is no knowledge or even conception concerning them at all 
apart from the effects they have on measuring instruments, which effects form the “actual” 
in Heisenberg’s terminology. In other words, while there is nothing we can know or even 
conceive about quantum objects and behavior, we do have knowledge of and can predict, 
probabilistically or statistically, their effects on those aspects of the world that we can 
perceive, know, and think about.  
The question of causality is, however, a subtle matter, especially given that one can 
define concepts of causality that are not classical. The subject, accordingly, merits a further 
discussion, which I would like to undertake now. I shall first comment, briefly, on the 
concepts of indeterminacy, randomness, chance, and probability, also in order to avoid 
misundertanding concerning how these concepts are defined here. For they can be defined 
otherwise, and some among such alternative definitons could, if used instead of those given 
here, make some of my claims unclear or problematic. 
Thus, while indeterminacy, randomness, and chance commonly refer to a 
manifestation of the unpredictable, their specific definitions may fluctuate. In the present 
definition, indeterminacy or chance is a more general category, while randomness will refer 
to a most radical form of indeterminacy, when even a probability is not and cannot be 
assigned to a possible future event. Sometimes, one speaks in such cases, of “absolute 
randomness.” Indeterminacy (including randomness) and chance are not the same, or at 
least are sometimes understood differently. These differences are, however, not germane 
in the present context, and I shall for the sake of convenience refer to indeterminacy 
throughout. It may or may not be possible to estimate whether an indeterminate event 
would occur, or sometimes even to anticipate it as an event, in which case this event is 
strictly random in the present definition. An indeterminate, including random, event may 
or may not result from some underlying causal processes, whether this process is accessible 
to us or not. The first eventuality defines classical indeterminacy or randomness, conceived 
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as ultimately underlain by a hidden classically causal architecture (which may be 
temporal); the second defines the irreducible indeterminacy and randomness, in the 
absence of such an underlying causal architecture, as is the case, automatically, in structural 
nonrealism. As indicated earlier, the ontological validity of the second concept of 
indeterminacy, including randomness, cannot be guaranteed, because one cannot 
definitively ascertain that this indeterminacy is not underlain by a classically causal 
architecture. While one might assume, as the RWR-type interpretations do, that quantum 
events do not result from such a process, it is impossible to definitively ascertain that they 
do not. It is impossible to ascertain that any indeterminate or random sequence is in fact 
indeterminate or random, and there is no mathematical proof that any such sequence 
actually is (Aronson 2013). Indeterminacy or randomness is, thus, an assumption that may 
only be practically justified insofar as an effective theory or interpretation based on this 
assumption is developed. 
Although often merely glossed over, the difference between probability and statistics 
is important in quantum theory (QM, QFT, and QTFD). I would like to briefly comment 
on this difference and on the role of probability and statistics in quantum theory more 
generally from the present, RWR-type, perspective, which in effect makes quantum theory 
a form of probability theory of quantum phenomena, admittedly, an argument that has also 
been made while adopting a realist interpretation of quantum theory. My remarks cannot 
of course do justice to this vast subject and are only aimed to address a few points especially 
relevant for my argument here.17 “Probabilistic” commonly refers to our estimates of the 
probabilities of either individual or collective events, such as that of a coin toss or of finding 
a quantum object in a given region of space. “Statistical” refers to our estimates concerning 
the outcomes of identical or similar experiments, such as that of multiple coin-tosses or 
repeated identically prepared experiments with quantum objects, or to the average behavior 
of certain objects or systems. Thus, the standard use of the term “quantum statistics” refers 
to the behavior of large multiplicities of identical quantum objects, such as electrons and 
photons, which behave differently, in accordance with, respectively, the Fermi-Dirac and 
the Bose-Einstein statistics. The Bayesian understanding defines probability as a degree of 
belief concerning a possible occurrence of an individual event on the basis of the relevant 
information we possess. This makes the probabilistic estimates involved, generally, 
subjective, at least at the time one makes them, although there may be agreement (possibly 
among a large number of individuals) concerning such estimates, which agreement or other 
exterior social factors may impact the “subjective” nature of a given estimate. The 
frequentist understanding, also referred to as “frequentist statistics,” defines probability in 
                                                        
17 For helpful comprehensive treatments, see (Khrennikov 2009) and Háyek 2014) and references 
there. On the Bayesian philosophy of probability, in two different versions of it, see (Jaynes 2003) 
and (De Finetti 2008).  
  32 
terms of sample data by emphasis on the frequency or proportion of these data, which is 
considered more objective. 
In quantum physics, as noted, exact predictions are in general impossible even in 
dealing with elemental individual processes and events, in view of the circumstance that, 
while the identical preparation of the instruments used can be controlled (because the 
behavior of their observable parts can be described classically), the behavior of quantum 
objects or of quantum parts of the instruments, which enable their interactions with 
quantum objects, and hence these interactions, cannot be so controlled. This compelled 
Bohr to speak “the finite [quantum] and uncontrollable interaction” between quantum 
objects and measuring instruments (Bohr 1935, pp. 697, 700). This is why the outcomes of 
repeated identically prepared quantum experiments will in general be different. This 
situation could, however, be interpreted either on Bayesian lines, that is, under the 
assumption that a probability could be assigned to individual quantum events, or on 
frequentist lines, that is, under the assumption that each individual effect is strictly random. 
The present article, again, adopts the frequentist nonrealist, RWR-type, view, considered, 
in part following W. Pauli, in (Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 173-186, Plotnitsky and Khrennikov 
2015).18 
Philosophically, probability introduces an element of order into situations defined by 
the role of randomness in them and enables us to handle such situations better. In other 
words, probability or statistics is about the interplay of indeterminacy or randomness and 
order. This interplay takes on a unique significance in quantum physics, because of the 
existence of quantum correlations, such as the EPR or EPR-Bell correlations, found in the 
experiments of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type (Einstein et al 1935) and considered 
in Bell’s and the Kochen-Specker theorems, and numerous related findings. These 
correlations manifest a form of statistical order and, thus, in the present terms, structure, a 
structure without law. They are properly predicted by QM, a (mathematical) structure 
governed by a law, which is, thus, along with and responding to quantum phenomena 
themselves, as much about order as about indeterminacy or randomness, and, most 
crucially, about their unique combination in quantum physics.  
I am now ready to return to causality. I shall first discuss in more detail classical 
causality, as an ontological category, part of the architecture of reality. The term causality 
has been most commonly used in this sense. It refers to the behavior of physical systems 
whose evolution is defined by the fact that the state of a given system (as idealized by a 
given theory or model) is determined at all moments of time by their state at a particular 
moment of time, indeed at any given moment of time. This concept is in accord with Kant’s 
                                                        
18 While neither Bohr nor Heisenberg appear to have definitively stated his position on this issue, 
both appear to have been inclined to a statistical view of the type adopted here. See (Plotnitsky 2016, 
pp. 180-184), for a discussion of Bohr’s view. For a nonrealist Bayesian approach to QM, known 
as QBism, see (Fuchs et al 2014). 
  33 
principle of causality, although the history of the principle (and of the concept of classical 
causality) is much longer, reaching all the way to (and even before) Plato. According to 
Plato: “Inquiry into nature is a search for the causes of each thing; why each thing comes 
into existence, why it goes out of existence, why it exists” (Phaedo, 96 a 6–10, Plato 2005). 
It is this view that was, in modern times, codified by Kant: “If, therefore, we experience 
that something happens, then we always presuppose that something else precedes it, which 
it follows in accordance with a rule” (Kant 1997, pp. 305, 308). This presupposition also 
defines the concept of classical causality (proceeding from causes to effects), and, in Kant 
and beyond, it is accompanied by and even arises from another presupposition, that of the 
possibility of forming a representation or at least a conception of the mechanism 
responsible for this rule, which presupposition defines realism. Quantum phenomena, in 
nonrealist, RWR-type, interpretations, violate this principle, because the cause of a given 
event could not in general be ascertained, even ideally or in principle. Only statistical 
correlations between events could be ascertained, correlations that defy classical causality.  
As indicated earlier, I use the concept of determinism as distinct from classical 
causality, a distinction that is useful for historical and conceptual reasons. If causality is an 
ontological category and as such is part of the architecture of reality, “determinism,” 
defined as an epistemological category, is part of our knowledge concerning reality or of 
observable effects of reality. It denotes our ability to predict the state of a system, at least, 
again, as defined by an idealized model, exactly, rather than probabilistically, at any 
moment of time once we know its state at a given moment of time. Determinism is 
sometimes used in the same sense as classical causality, and in the case of classical 
mechanics, which deals with single objects or a small number of objects, both coincide.19 
Once a system is sufficiently large, one needs a superhuman power to predict its behavior 
exactly, as was famously explained by P. S. Laplace, who invented the figure of Laplace’s 
demon, as an image of this power. While it follows automatically that noncausal behavior, 
considered at the level of a given model, cannot be handled deterministically, the reverse 
is not true. The emphasized qualification is necessary because it is possible to have 
classically causal models of those processes in nature that may not ultimately be classically 
causal processes. The fact that classically causal models of classical physics apply and are 
effective within the proper scope of classical physics does not mean that the ultimate 
character of the processes that are responsible for classical phenomena is classically causal. 
They may not be, for example, by virtue of their ultimately quantum nature. Conversely, 
as explained earlier, an effective model that is not classically causal, for example, that of 
QM in RWR-type interpretations, does not guarantee that quantum behavior itself is not 
causal. It may ultimately prove to be classically causal or amenable to a realist treatment, 
                                                        
19 There are still other uses of the term, for example, in referring to Schrödinger’s equation, on which 
I shall comment below. 
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that is, a corresponding model could ultimately prove to be equally or more in accord with 
what is observed. Factually, quantum phenomena, again, only preclude determinism, 
because identically prepared quantum experiments in general lead to different outcomes: 
while individual quantum experiments are repeatable in terms of the state of measuring 
instruments before they are performed, they are not repeatable as concerns their outcomes. 
Only the statistics of multiple identically prepared experiments are repeatable. It would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to do science without being able to reproduce at least the 
statistical data. The lack of classical causality or of realism in the corresponding 
interpretations of quantum phenomena and QM are interpretive inferences from this 
situation and additional quantum features such as correlations and the uncertainty relations, 
or complementarity, which make it difficult or even impossible to assume the existence of 
a classically causal architecture underlying quantum phenomena.20 
I shall now consider certain alternative conceptions of causality pertinent to my 
argument. Thus, the term “causality” is often used in accordance with the requirements of 
special relativity, which restricts (classical) causes to those occurring in the backward 
(past) light cone of the event that is seen as an effect of this cause, while no event can be a 
cause of any event outside the forward (future) light cone of that event. In other words, no 
physical causes can propagate faster that the speed of light in a vacuum, c, which 
requirement also implies temporal locality. Technically, this requirement only restricts 
classical causality, by a relativistic antecedence postulate, rather than precludes it, and 
relativity theory itself, special or general, is (locally) a classically causal and indeed 
deterministic theory. By contrast, while, as a probabilistic or statistical theory of quantum 
phenomena, QM lacks classical causality, at least in nonrealist interpretations, it respects 
local “causality” as concerns its probabilistic or statistical predictions, which are consistent 
with both temporal and spatial locality, and hence the relativistic antecedence. The same is 
true in the case of QTFD or QFT, which conforms to special relativity in the first place, 
although there are nonrelativistic versions of quantum field theory. Thus, the compatibility 
with relativistic or, more generally, locality requirements would be maintained insofar as 
an already performed experiment determines, probabilistically or (if repeated many times) 
statistically, a possible outcome of a future experiment, without assuming classical 
causality. Determinism is, again, precluded on experimental grounds. In sum, whatever 
actually happens is defined by spatially and temporally local factors, although the 
probabilistic or statistical predictions, while always made locally in physical terms, need 
not be local and could concern distant events, as in situations of the EPR type. 
                                                        
20 Such interpretations, again, do not exclude the possibility of causal or realist interpretations of 
QM, or alternative causal or realist quantum theories, such as Bohmian mechanics (which is, 
nonlocal), or theories defined by deeper underlying causal dynamics, which makes QM an 
“emergent” theory. Among recent proposals is Khrennikov’s “pre-quantum classical statistical field 
theory” (Khrennikov 2012; Khrennikov and Plotnitsky 2015). 
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Relativistic causality is, thus, a manifestation of a more general concept or principle, 
that of locality, and one can generalize relativistic causality, accordingly, without assuming 
special relativity first. This principle states that no instantaneous transmission of physical 
influences between spatially separated physical systems (“action at a distance”) is allowed 
or that physical systems can only be physically influenced by their immediate environment. 
Nonlocality in this sense is usually (there are exceptions) seen as undesirable. Standard 
QM appears to avoid it. As just explained, under certain circumstances, such as those of 
the EPR-type experiments, QM can make predictions concerning the state of spatially 
separated systems, while allowing one to maintain that the physical circumstances of 
making these predictions and verifying them are local.21 However, the question of the 
locality of QM or quantum phenomena is a matter of much debate and controversy, 
especially in the wake of the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems and related findings, 
although this question was at stake in the Bohr-Einstein debate from its inception in the 
late 1920s, but especially following the EPR paper (Einstein et al 1935, Bohr 1935).22  
Finally, I would like to propose the concept of quantum causality. I shall do so via 
Bohr’s concept of complementarity, which, for reasons that will become apparent 
presently, Bohr saw as a generalization of classical causality, and which is consistent with 
relativistic causality. Complementarity is a concept defined by  
 
(a) a mutual exclusivity of certain phenomena, entities, or conceptions; and yet  
(b) the possibility of considering each one of them separately at any given point; and  
(c) the necessity of considering all of them at different moments for a comprehensive 
account of the totality of phenomena that one must consider in quantum physics.  
 
Complementarity may be seen as a reflection of the fact that, in a radical departure from 
classical physics or relativity, the behavior of quantum objects of the same type, say, 
electrons, is not governed, individually or collectively, by the same “physical law,” 
                                                        
21 The EPR experiment originally proposed by EPR in dealing with continuous variables cannot be 
performed in a laboratory (because the quantum state defining this experiment is not normalizable), 
which has never put in question its legitimacy for the theoretical arguments concerning or based on 
it. Related experiments for discrete variables, most famously those by A. Aspect, based on Bohm’s 
version of the EPR experiment for spin (Aspect et al. 1982), have been performed, as were 
experiments statistically approximating the EPR experiment. 
22 These debates cannot be addressed within the scope of this article, although the concept of 
“structure without law” and structural nonrealism may bear on the questions considered in these 
debates. The literature dealing with these subjects is nearly as immense as that on interpretations of 
QM. Among the standard treatments are (Bell 2004, Cushing and McMullin 1989, and Ellis and 
Amati 2000). See also (Brunner et al 2014), for current assessment of Bell’s theorem. These 
theorems and most of these findings pertain to quantum data, and do not depend on QM.  
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especially a representational physical law, in all possible contexts, and specifically in 
complementary contexts. Speaking of “physical law” in this connection requires caution, 
because, in Bohr’s interpretation, there is no physical law representing this behavior (and 
thus, again, no value-definitiveness found in classical physics or relativity), not even a 
probabilistic law if one adopts a statistical, rather than a Bayesian, view of the elemental 
individual quantum behavior. I mean that the behavior of quantum objects leads to 
mutually incompatible observable physical effects in complementary setups or contexts, 
an incompatibility not found in classical physics or relativity. On the other hand, the 
mathematical formalism of QM offers correct probabilistic or statistical predictions (no 
other predictions are, again, possible) of quantum phenomena in all contexts, in nonrealist 
interpretations, under the assumption that quantum objects and their behavior are beyond 
representation or even conception.23  
If one adopts a nonrealist, RWR-type, interpretation of quantum phenomena and 
quantum theory, the nature of both experimental and theoretical physics changes. 
Experimentally we no longer track, as we do in classical physics or relativity, the 
independent behavior of the systems considered, track what happens in any event. Instead 
we define what will happen in the experiments we perform, by how we experiment with 
nature by means of our experimental technology, even though and because we can only 
predict what will happen probabilistically or statistically. Thus, in the double-slit 
experiment, the two alternative setups of the experiment, whether we, respectively, can or 
cannot know, even in principle, through which slit each particle, say, an electron, passes, 
we obtain two different outcomes of the statistical distributions of the traces on the screen 
(with which each particle collides). Or, in effect equivalently to the double-slit experiment, 
while also giving a rigorous meaning to the uncertainty relations, we can set up our 
apparatus so as to measure and correspondingly predict, again, probabilistically or 
statistically, either the position or the momentum of a given quantum object, but never both 
together. Either case requires a separate experiment, incompatible with the other, rather 
than representing an arbitrary selection of either type of measurement within the same 
physical situation, by tracking either one of its aspects or the other, as we do in classical 
mechanics. There, this is possible because we can, at least in principle, assign 
simultaneously both quantities within the same experimental arrangement. In quantum 
                                                        
23 I note in passing that complementarity is connected to the concept of contextuality, prominent in 
discussions of quantum foundations in the wake of Bell’s and the Kochen-Specker theorems and 
related findings, mentioned earlier, originating, again, in the EPR-type experiments. See, the works 
cited in note 22 and (Dzhafarov et al 2016). I might add that by being grounded in the idea of 
physical law, the view of complementarity just outlined is, philosophically, more radical than the 
view of quantum phenomena defined by the concept contextuality, as it is commonly understood, 
as in the works just cited, for example. I qualify because one could similarly ground the idea of 
contextuality. In effect, this grounding is implied by my outline of complementarity. 
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physics, we cannot. While all modern physics, from Galileo on, has always been 
fundamentally experimental, as it was also, and correlatively, mathematical, quantum 
physics changes what experiments do: they define what will or will not happen in terms of 
probabilistic or statistical predictions, rather than follow what is bound to happen in 
accordance with classical causality.24 
It is this probabilistic or statistical determination (which respects relativistic causality 
and locality) of what can or conversely cannot happen, as a result of our conscious decision 
concerning which experiment to perform at a given moment in time, that defines what I 
call “quantum causality,” the concept introduced in (Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 203-206). More 
rigorously, quantum causality is defined as follows: Whatever happens as a quantum event 
and is registered as such (thus providing us with the initial data) defines a possible set of, 
in general probabilistically or statistically, predictable outcomes of future events and 
irrevocably rules out the possibility of our predictions concerning certain other, such as 
and in particular complementary, events. 
Bohr’s complementarity is clearly in accord with this concept. Indeed, this concept, in 
my view, gives a fitting meaning to Bohr’s view of complementarity as a generalization of 
(classical) causality, to which it converts in the classical limit, where there is no 
complementarity and where our predictions could be considered ideally exact in dealing 
with individual or small classical systems (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 41). On the one hand, while 
stemming from “our freedom of handling the measuring instruments, characteristic of the 
very idea of experiment” in all physics, our “free choice” concerning what kind of 
experiment we want to perform acquires a new meaning with complementarity (Bohr 1935, 
p. 699). As against classical physics or relativity, implementing our decision concerning 
what we want to do will allow us to make only certain types of predictions and will exclude 
the possibility of certain other, complementary, types of predictions. Complementarity, 
then, generalizes causality in the absence of classical causality and, in the first place, 
realism, because it defines what reality can and cannot be brought about as a result of our 
decision concerning which experiment we perform. The predictions defined by 
complementarity will still be probabilistic or statistical, forming in Schrödinger’s language, 
expectation-catalogs (Schrödinger 1935, p. 154), reflecting the probabilistic or statistical 
aspects of complementarity or the uncertainty relations.25  
                                                        
24 Of course, we can sometimes define by an experiment what will happen in classical physics as 
well, say, by rolling a ball on a smooth surface, as Galileo did in considering inertia. In this case, 
however, we can then observe the resulting process without affecting it. This is not the case in 
quantum physics, because any new observation essentially interferes with the quantum object under 
investigation and defines a new experiment and a new course of events. Only some observations do 
in classical physics. 
25 If Schrödinger’s equation may be seen as “deterministic,” as it is sometimes (in my view, 
misleadingly), it is only in the sense that it determinately provides such expectation-catalogs. 
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On the other hand, while quantum causality was defined here via complementarity and 
while the connections between them are important, technically, quantum causality does not 
depend on complementarity. This independence suggests that complementary effects, 
which are comprehended by Bohr’s concept of complementarity, are manifestations, in 
quantum phenomena, of some deeper specific, but if one adopt a nonrealist, RWR-type, 
view, not specifiable, ingredient of the ultimate constitution of reality. In other words, there 
is something in the ultimate nature of reality that is not only manifested in quantum 
phenomena but also in the fact that some of them are complementary. This statement is of 
course trivially correct if one adopts Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM, 
an interpretation grounded in the concept of complementarity, although not only in this 
concept, given, for example, the role of his concept of phenomenon in it. My point, 
however, is that, as essential to the ultimate constitution of nature, this ingredient will have 
its effects in other, perhaps all, consistent interpretations of quantum phenomena and QM, 
as things stand now, including QM itself. Depending on an interpretation, these effects may 
be different from, if possibly related to, those captured by Bohr’s concept of 
complementarity. Thus, the EPR-type effects, manifested in quantum correlations, may be 
already a manifestation of this ingredient, apart from their complementary character, which 
defines these effects in Bohr’s interpretation (Bohr 1935, p. 700). One might, in principle, 
argue that the uncertainty relations (represented in the formalism of QM by the 
corresponding noncommuting variables) are a manifestation of this ingredient, which 
would imply complementarity. While the first claim is likely to be true, the second is a 
more complicated matter, because, although complementarity provides an interpretation of 
the uncertainty relations, it is not equivalent to them; and hence it is, in principle, possible 
to have the uncertainty relations without complementarity. Many technical and even some 
philosophical discussions of the uncertainty relations do not mention complementarity, 
although some in effect imply it. Neither Dirac’s not von Neumann’s classic books mention 
complementarity (von Neumann 1932; Dirac 1958). Feynman even saw the uncertainty 
relations as a remnant of classical physics, no longer necessary once one adopted a more 
modern view: 
 
                                                        
However, as expectation-catalogs, these catalogs are catalogs of predictions that are not 
deterministic, in the present view irreducibly, given the absence of classical causality in the 
emergence of quantum phenomena. The linearity of Schrödinger’s equation or of the formalism of 
QM in general may be seen from this perspective, insofar as it would appear unlikely to represent 
anything physical leading to the nature of these catalogs, thus inviting an nonrealist, RWR-type, 
view, even if, admittedly, not making it imperative. It is enigmatic enough that QM can predict 
them. The RWR-type interpretations, beginning with that of Bohr, leave this quantum enigma or 
mystery unresolved, but they also change the nature of thought and knowledge, by making that 
which beyond thought and knowledge part of them. 
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I would like to put the uncertainty principle in its historical place: When the revolutionary 
ideas of quantum physics were first coming out, people still tried to understand them in 
terms of old-fashioned ideas (such as, light goes in straight lines). But at a certain point the 
old-fashioned ideas would begin to fail, so a warning was developed that said, in effect, 
‘Your old-fashioned ideas are no damn good when . . . ’ If you get rid of all the old-fashioned 
ideas and instead use the ideas that I’m expounding in these lectures—adding arrows for all 
the ways an event can happen [by working with the probability amplitudes]—there is no 
need for an uncertainty principle! (Feynman 1985, pp. 55, n. 3) 
 
Feynman’s view of the situation, expressed in here in “adding arrows for all the way an 
event can happen,” is in fact close to quantum causality, as defined here, and in effect takes 
into account complementarity, which affects how these arrows can or cannot be added. It 
is worth noting that this type of argument would not apply to quantum correlations, which 
fact, however, corroborates Feynman’s point. Quantum correlations are strictly quantum. 
In any event, although neither is entirely empirical (nothing, again, ever is), quantum 
correlations and the uncertainty relations are connected more closely to the corresponding 
experimental evidence and more directly predictable, probabilistically or statistically, by 
QM than is complementarity, which has a broader conceptual structure.26 
I close this section, which thus far have been focused on nonrealism, with a discussion 
of the concept of structure. A structure is a collection, usually a set, of (abstract) objects 
and relationships among them, conforming to certain specified rules—a collection 
organized according certain specific rules, for example, commonly in mathematics and 
science, certain formal mathematical rules or, in the present extension of the concept of 
structure, certain correlational rules or patterns.27 In the first case, we can define what may 
be called the law of a structure—a specifiable set of rules that govern the structure and 
allow one to generate new configurations within the structure or, in physics, if the structure 
represents independent objects and processes in nature, know or conceive, at least in 
principle, how such configurations emerge. In the second case, however, in dealing with 
(statistical) correlational structures, such may not be the case, and it is not in nonrealist 
                                                        
26 This sense of the situation was in part suggested to me by R. B. Griffiths’ recent article (Griffiths 
2017), in which the deeper ingredient of reality in question appears to manifest itself in terms of 
“incompatible frameworks” (which are at most only indirectly related to complementarity, as 
defined by Bohr), and by Griffiths’ comments on the first version of the present article. It is not my 
aim to address Griffiths’ interpretation of QM (in terms of consistent histories), except by noting, 
by way of confirming my main point at the moment, that this interpretation is essentially different 
from that of Bohr or the one adopted here, which are nonrealist, RWR-type. That of Griffiths’, by 
contrast, aims to represent, in a realist way, the ultimate constitution of reality, a representation that 
is, in Bohr’s words, “in principle excluded” in Bohr’s sent interpretation, the difference in fact 
stressed by Griffiths himself in his article. 
27 A comprehensive analysis of mathematical structuralism is given in (Corry 2013). 
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interpretations of quantum correlations. There probabilities or statistics are fundamentally 
linked to, and are indeed defined by, the mathematical structures representing the ultimate 
constituents of the system considered, such as individual molecules that are assumed to 
behave in accordance with the laws of classical mechanics in classical statistical physics. 
By contrast, QM relates these two types of structures by means of predictions, in nonrealist 
interpretations under the assumption that there is no available or conceivable law defining 
the structure of these correlations themselves. There is no law that would allow us to know 
or even conceive of how these correlations actually emerge. 
This situation, thus, compels us to reconceive the concept of structure. This concept 
still preserves the concept of organization, as it would be difficult or even impossible to 
conceive of a structure apart from organization and difficult to conceive of an organization 
apart from the law of this organization (e.g., Derrida 1978, pp. 273, 279). However, in 
parallel with the concept of reality without realism, this concept defined a structure as 
something that is without a law of structure, that is, without a conceivable law governing 
the emergence of this structure. While, then, it may be true that it is impossible to think of 
the concept of a structure lacking any law, in the present, RWR-view of quantum 
phenomena, this statement can be taken literally: nature, at the ultimate (quantum) level of 
its constitution creates (correlational) structures the emergence of which is unthinkable and 
as such outlaws any law that we can think of, beginning with the idea of law itself. I 
reiterate that at stake is not merely something that is as yet unthought, but something that 
is rigorously unthinkable, is beyond conception. There are, again, correlational laws or 
rules governing the effects involved and the mathematical laws of QM, within the law of 
the structure of the formalism, that predict these effects and these correlations, but there is 
no law of these correlational structures and thus no structure that would allow us to know 
or conceive how these correlational structures are possible. 
J. A. Wheeler spoke of “law without law” in quantum theory (Wheeler 1983). It is not 
surprising that he ultimately linked this “law without law” to quantum information and, 
with the help of R. Feynman (his doctoral student), to quantum computing. Quantum 
processes, in their interactions with measuring instruments, create specifically organized 
collections of information (composed of classical bits) and make possible certain 
calculations, by using law-governed mathematical structures or models, but we cannot 
know and possibly cannot conceive how quantum processes do this. The ultimate 
(quantum) constitution of matter is, according to Wheeler, “it from bit,” “it” inferred from 
“bit” (Wheeler 1990). In the present view, this “it,” while real, is beyond thought, and as 
such, cannot ultimately be called “it,” any more than anything else. Wheeler’s visionary 
manifesto was inspired by Bohr, whom Wheeler invoked, on the same page, when he 
announced his “it from bit:” “The overarching principle of 20th-century physics, the 
quantum— and the principle of complementarity that is the central idea of the quantum — 
leaves us no escape, Niels Bohr tells us, from ‘a radical revision of our attitude [towards 
  41 
the problem of] of physical reality’” (Wheeler 1990, p. 309; Bohr 1935, p. 697). (I correct 
Wheeler’s slight misquotation of Bohr.) As I argue here, this revision is deeply rooted in 
Heisenberg’s thinking that led him to his discovery of quantum mechanics and Bohr to his 
interpretation of it, which, jointly, defined the spirit of Copenhagen, as, I also argue, the 
spirit of structural realism and the spirit of quantum information theory. I shall now explain 
in more detail why this is the case. 
 
 
4. Revisiting the Origins of Quantum Nonrealism: From Continuous Motion of 
Objects to Discrete States and Phenomena, with Bohr and Heisenberg 
 
For nearly a century since the publication of von Neumann’s seminal The Mathematical 
Foundation of Quantum Mechanics (Von Neumann 1932), the mathematical models of 
quantum theory—QM, QTFD, and QFT—have been commonly defined in terms of the 
Hilbert-space formalism, the axioms of which provide, in present terms, the law of this 
structure.28 Grounding the quantum-mechanical formalism, already developed, if less 
rigorously, by Heisenberg, Born, Jordan, Dirac, and others, in this way was the aim of von 
Neumann’s approach, with his most comprehensive exposition given in his book. By 
contrast, Heisenberg, in his discovery of QM and in his exposition given in his paper 
announcing this discovery (Heisenberg 1925), did not start with a mathematical model. He 
discovered this model, or at least a mathematical scheme, more properly developed into 
such a model, matrix mechanics by Born and Jordan soon thereafter (Born and Jordan 
1925).29 Heisenberg’s scheme was deduced, with the help of profound, if not always fully 
rigorous, intuitions, from certain physical features of quantum phenomena and principles, 
physical and mathematical, arising from these features.30 Other figures just mentioned 
primarily more properly grounded, generalized, and refined Heisenberg’s scheme. Dirac 
                                                        
28 While there are other versions of the quantum-mechanical formalism, such as those of C*-algebras 
and, more recently, category theory, thus far all equivalent mathematically, the Hilbert-space 
formalism remains dominant. For a helpful account on this line of thinking and its subsequent 
history, see (Cassinelli and Lahti 2016).  
29 It is sometimes argued that it is difficult or even impossible to properly speak of a mathematical 
model short of von Neumann’s or some similarly axiomatic formulation. While it is, to some degree, 
a matter of one’s definition of a model (see Note 8), this view does not appear to me justified. At 
least as developed by Born and Jordan, matrix mechanics, or Dirac’s q-number formalism, is 
sufficient to qualify as a model. The question of what constitutes a rigorous derivation of a model 
is of course separate, and I will comment on it in the next section. See Notes 44 and 45 below. 
30 Schrödinger’s approach to quantum mechanics was based on different, classical-like principles, 
but, as noted earlier, he could not avoid bringing in some quantum principles either, against his own 
grain (Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 84-98). 
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offered, arguably, the most general formal version of the formalism before von Neumann, 
who in fact thought that Dirac’s version lacked a proper mathematical rigor, in part because 
of Dirac’s use of his delta function, which was not considered legitimate mathematically 
at the time. Eventually, in the 1940s, it was given a proper mathematical definition, but as 
a so-called “distribution,” essentially a functional, by Laurent Schwartz, which 
retroactively mathematically legitimatized Dirac’s version of quantum formalism.31  
Heisenberg abandoned the project of representing the behavior of electrons in atoms. 
It is true that he only thought that such a representation was difficult or unlikely to achieve 
at the time, as opposed to arguing, as Bohr did in the 1930s, that such a representation and 
even an analysis, if not conception, of this behavior or quantum behavior in general was 
“in principle excluded” (Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 62). Still, Heisenberg’s was an audacious and 
radical move, which also decisively shaped Bohr’s subsequent thinking, although 
Heisenberg’s thinking was in turn influenced by Bohr’s 1913 atomic theory. Bohr’s theory 
only partially abandoned the geometrical representation of quantum behavior in the case 
of “quantum jumps”—transitions between the stationary states of electrons, conceived in 
terms of electrons orbiting the nuclei. While Bohr’s theory, as developed by him and other 
had many major successes, by the early 1920s, this semi-classical view itself proved to be 
unsustainable. This failure compelled Heisenberg to renounce a geometrical representation 
of any quantum behavior, including that of stationary states in terms of orbits, and, while 
retaining certain key aspects of Bohr’s theory, to ground his approach to quantum 
phenomena even more radically epistemologically. This more radical approach led him to 
his discovery of quantum mechanics in 1925. In this respect, to return to Einstein’s 
characterization, “Heisenberg’s purely algebraic method” was a shift from geometry to 
algebra in fundamental physics, a shift, in this case, correlative to those toward the concepts 
of structure without law, reality without realism, and probability without causality, none of 
which would have appealed to Einstein, because there was no longer an algebraic 
representation either, continuous or discontinuous, of quantum objects and behavior either 
(Einstein 1936, p. 378). 
It is true that we speak of, and can rigorously define, Hilbert spaces and their geometry, 
and in this sense, one could also speak, as Dirac was reportedly fond of doing, of 
geometrical thinking in QM, by analogy with projective or finite geometries, which equally 
defy visualization by means of our general phenomenal intuition. This, however, is not in 
conflict with my point, or with Einstein’s characterization of Heisenberg’s method as 
essentially algebraic. I would argue that these spaces and geometries may, as spaces and 
geometries, be seen as “symbolic” or “metaphorical,” or better, in terms of structure, 
essentially, an algebraic concept. Ultimately, these spaces and their geometries are special, 
                                                        
31 This case poses deep questions concerning the mathematical rigor of physics or of mathematical 
models used in physics, and it became famous in this connection. See, Note 29 above. 
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“spatial-like,” forms of algebra, as against the more standard forms of geometry, such as 
Euclidean or even non-Euclidean geometry, or differential geometry, used in general 
relativity. The geometries of these more conventional spaces are, however, defined by 
certain algebraic properties and relations (such as “distance”), some of which can be used 
to define Hilbert spaces. In other words, these properties and relations define the structure 
of Hilbert spaces or, similarly, other mathematical “spaces,” (such as those of projective 
geometries, abstract algebraic varieties, the spaces of noncommutative geometry, 
geometric groups, and so forth), but in the absence of certain other, more conventionally 
spatial elements and structures, geometrical or topological, found in more conventional 
spatial objects, such as the three-dimensional Euclidean space, the paradigmatic model of 
phenomenal spatiality. This is why I speak of the symbolic or metaphorical character of 
“space” and “geometry” in the case of Hilbert spaces. This character arises in part by virtue 
of the infinite-dimensional nature of some of those “spaces” or also the fact that they are 
defined over complex numbers, which appear irreducible in QM. The Hilbert spaces 
involved are finite in the case of discrete variables, but these spaces can still have higher 
(if finite) dimensions and are over complex numbers, and thus are ultimately “algebraic” 
in the same sense. It is difficult to surmise, especially from reported statements, what Dirac 
exactly had in mind in his appeals to geometrical thinking in quantum theory. If, however, 
one is to judge by his writings, they appear to suggest that at stake are the algebraic 
properties and relations modeled on those found in geometrical objects, defined by 
algebraic structures, as just explained, such as, at the time, projective geometry. 
Indicatively, notwithstanding his insistence on geometry in Dirac’s quantum-theoretical 
thinking, O. Darigold’s analysis of this thinking shows precisely the significance of algebra 
there (Darigold 1993). Thus, as he says, “roughly, Dirac’s quantum mechanics could be 
said to be to ordinary mechanics what noncommutative geometry is to intuitive geometry” 
(Darigold 1993). Noncommutative geometry, the invention of which was in part inspired 
by the mathematics of QM, is in effect a form of spatial-like algebra just described (Connes 
1994, p. 38; Plotnitsky 2009, pp. 112-113). 
In what sense, apart from certain essentially algebraic properties, may such spaces be 
seen as spaces, for example and in particular, in the sense of visualizing, imagining, or 
intuiting them? The subject is complex, and it is, it might be added, still far from 
sufficiently explored in cognitive psychology and related fields. It is almost certainly true 
that, when we visualize such objects, we visualize only three- (and even two-) dimensional 
configurations and supplement them by algebraic structures and intuitions, as Feynman 
observed in describing visual intuition in thinking about quantum objects (cited in 
Schweber 1994, pp. 465–466). These problems, again, manifested in finite and projective 
geometries, arise even for spaces or geometries of finite dimensions, once the number of 
dimensions is more than three, or for spaces of any dimensions, beginning with the 
complex plane itself, defined over number fields other than that of real numbers, such as 
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those used in complex analysis or algebraic geometry, or, again, noncommutative 
geometry. Algebraic geometry even arrives at such esoteric concepts as spaces without 
points. Discrete geometries (which have the topological dimension zero), introduced in the 
nineteenth century, or projective geometries, and even non-Euclidean geometries, pose 
these problems as well. J. Tate in this connection famously defined the following 
philosophy, which fully applies in spaces and geometries of quantum theory: “Think 
Geometrically, Prove Algebraically:”  
 
It is also possible to look at polynomial equations and their solutions in rings and fields 
other than Z or Q or R or C. For example, one might look at polynomial with coefficients 
in the finite field Fp with p elements and ask for solutions whose coordinates are also in the 
field Fp. You may worry about your geometric intuitions in situations like this. How can 
one visualize points and curves and directions in A2 when the points of A2 are pairs (x, y) 
with x, yÎFp? There are two answers to this question. The first and most reassuring is that 
you can continue to think of the usual Euclidean plane, i.e., R2, and most of your geometric 
intuitions concerning points and curves will still be true when you switch to coordinates in 
Fp. The second and more practical answer is that the affine and projective planes and affine 
and projective curves are defined algebraically in terms of ordered pairs (r, s) or 
homogeneous triples [a, b, c] without any reference to geometry. So in proving things one 
can work algebraically using coordinates, without worrying at all about geometrical 
intuitions. We might summarize this general philosophy as: Think Geometrically, Prove 
Algebraically” (Silverman and Tate 2015, p. 277).  
 
Rigorously then, in these cases, or in dealing with Hilbert spaces in quantum mechanics, 
and in truth in the cases of most so-called spatial and geometrical structures we ultimately 
think algebraically, too, even if with the help of geometrical or topological intuitions. It is 
quite obvious that these intuitions are ultimately limited even when we deal with curves in 
the usual Euclidean plane, let alone in considering objects like Riemann surfaces as curves 
over C. 
In sum, Einstein was quite right in characterizing Heisenberg’s method as “purely 
algebraic.” The “geometry” of the Hilbert spaces of quantum theory only confirms the 
algebraic character of this method, admittedly especially manifested in his matrix or 
operator algebra. These algebraic structures, as structures defined by law, relate to 
structures without law manifested in quantum phenomena, in the absence of any underlying 
ultimate geometrical reality, akin to that found in relativity, for example, which was of 
course what was most disconcerting to Einstein in “Heisenberg’s purely algebraic method.” 
Although one could sometimes surmise the meaning of the term “principle” from its 
use, it is, similarly to the term “concept,” rarely defined or explained in physical or even 
philosophical literature. His title notwithstanding, Heisenberg did not do so in his first 
book, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory (Heisenberg 1930), nor did Dirac, 
in his equally famous, Principles of Quantum Mechanics, originally published in the same 
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year as Heisenberg’s book (Dirac 1930). For present purposes, I shall adopt the concept of 
principle from Einstein’s concept of a “principle theory,” which he introduced by way of 
juxtaposing this concept to that of a “constructive theory.” This concept corresponds to the 
use of principles by Bohr and Heisenberg, and by quantum-information theorists discussed 
in the next section. According to Einstein, constructive theories aim “to build up a picture 
of the more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme 
from which they start out,” which, it follows, also make such theories realist. By contrast, 
principle theories “employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which 
form their basis and starting point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically 
discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to 
mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical 
representations of them have to satisfy” (Einstein 1919, p. 228). I would add the following 
qualification, which is likely to have been accepted by Einstein: Principles are not 
empirically discovered but formulated on the basis of empirically established evidence. A 
principle theory may also be a constructive theory, but it need not be, and Heisenberg’s 
matrix mechanics was not.32  
                                                        
32 It should be noted that, although the terms “principle,” “postulate,” and “axioms,” are sometimes 
used in physics indiscriminately and interchangeably with each other (mathematicians, by necessity, 
tend to be more careful), the term and concept of “principle” is used in this article strictly in the 
specific definition just given. It is difficult to entirely avoid overlapping between the concepts 
designated by these terms, and sometimes those designated as “laws,” especially because physical 
principles are often accompanied by or derive from (or conversely give rise to) postulates. It may 
also be a matter of the functioning of these concepts. Thus, conservation laws are sometimes seen 
as conservation principles. It is possible, however, to sufficiently, even if not entirely, analytically 
separate these concepts, along the following lines. Euclid and, it appears, the ancient Greeks in 
general, distinguished between “axioms” and “postulates.” Axioms were thought to be something 
manifestly self-evident, such as the first axiom of Euclid (“things equal to the same thing are also 
equal to each other”). A postulate, by contrast, is postulated, in the sense of “let us assume that A 
holds,” thus indicating primarily that one aims to proceed under assumption A and see what follows 
from it according to established logical rules (this is similar to proceeding from axioms), rather than 
claiming A to be a self-evident truth. Euclid’s postulates may be thought of as those assumptions 
that were necessary and sufficient to derive the truths of geometry, of some of which we might 
already be intuitively persuaded (e.g., “the first postulate: to draw a straight line from any point to 
any point”). The famous fifth postulate is a case in point. It defines Euclidean geometry alone, which 
in part explains millennia of attempts to derive it as a theorem. Keeping in mind further complexities 
potentially involved in using and defining these concepts in geometry and beyond, I shall adopt this 
Euclidean understanding of axioms and postulates. Given that my subject is physics, I shall 
primarily refer to postulates, assumed on the basis of experimental evidence (as it stands now and 
hence is potentially refutable) and often, but not always, grounding principles. This is, to some 
degree, in contrast to the axiomatic approaches to quantum foundations, which, from von Neumann 
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Heisenberg’s approach and then Bohr’s interpretation of QM adopted the following 
principles (with Bohr’s complementarity principle added in 1927): 
 
(1) the principle of discreteness or the QD principle, according to which all observable 
quantum phenomena are individual and discrete in relation to each other (which is not the 
same as the atomic discreteness of quantum objects themselves);  
(2) the principle of the probabilistic or statistical nature of quantum predictions, the 
QP/QS principle, which is maintained (in contrast to classical statistical physics) even in 
the case of elemental individual quantum processes, and is, as a principle, accompanied by 
a special, nonadditive, nature of quantum probabilities and rules, such as Born’s rule, for 
deriving them; and  
(3) the correspondence principle, which, as initially understood by Bohr, required that 
the predictions of quantum theory must coincide with those of classical mechanics at the 
classical limit, but which was given by Heisenberg a more rigorous form and was made 
into “the mathematical correspondence principle,” requiring that the equations of QM 
convert into those of classical mechanics in the classical limit. 
 
The QD principle originated in the quantum postulates of Bohr’s 1913 atomic theory, 
according to which, “the frequencies [of emitted radiation] appear as functions of two 
variables … in the form: 
 
v(n, n - a) =1/h {W(n) - W (n - a)}” (Heisenberg 1925, p. 263). 
 
This rule and Bohr’s quantum postulates, to begin with, are in irreconcilable conflict with 
both classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics. The QD and QP/QS principles are 
in fact correlative. The QP/QS principle is expressed in the quantum-mechanical formalism 
by the formula for the probability amplitudes cum Born’s rule, which was a postulate added 
to, rather than derived from, the formalism. Heisenberg only formulated or (given that it 
was not expressly stated by him) used this postulate in the special case of the transitions 
                                                        
on, are primarily, even if not entirely (it is not possible to avoid physical postulates or principles), 
concerned with the mathematical formalism of QM, where the term axiom is more fitting. Next to 
nothing has the self-evidence of axioms even in classical mechanics (in part, as against, its 
mathematical models), and most of the uses of the term “axiom” in physics, including in the 
quantum-informational schemes considered here, are in effect closer to that of “postulate,” as just 
defined. Bohr, more careful and more etymologically attuned than most in using his terms, prefers 
both postulates, such as the quantum postulate (Bohr 1987, v. 1, pp. 52-53), and principles, such as 
his correspondence principle. Complementarity functions as both a concept and a principle in Bohr. 
The term was also eventually used by Bohr to designate his overall interpretation of quantum 
phenomena and quantum mechanics. 
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between stationary states (“quantum jumps”), and not, as Born did, as universally 
applicable in QM. Referring to stationary states requires cautions, because stationary, in 
Bohr’s theory, only means that the electrons remained in their orbits with the same energy, 
were in the same “energy-state,” but would continuously change their position or their 
“position-state” along each orbit. On the other hand, the electrons would discontinuously, 
by “quantum jumps,” change their energy states, or their other states, by moving from one 
orbit to another. In Heisenberg, there were no longer orbits but only states and 
discontinuous transitions between states. 
As noted from the outset, one was no longer thinking, as in classical mechanics, in 
terms of predictions, even probabilistic predictions, concerning a moving object, say, an 
electron, free or orbiting the nucleus of an atom, but instead in terms of the probabilities of 
transitions between the states of an electron (Freidel 2016). This would imply that the 
concept of motion, as we know it (classical or relativistic), could no longer apply to an 
electron, but some form of concept of physical state, such as that corresponding to a given 
energy measurement, could be, albeit with qualification and caution, if one assumes that 
the independent behavior of the atom is beyond representation or even conception, 
including a mathematical one.33 I shall comment on this point presently. This type of 
thinking itself emerged already in Bohr’s 1913 atomic theory in considering an electron’s 
transitions from one energy level to another (levels corresponding to stationary states) but 
became a new way of thinking about phenomena or objects in quantum physics in general. 
As Heisenberg said shortly before he completed his paper introducing QM: “What I really 
like in this scheme is that one can really reduce all interactions between atoms and the 
external world ... to transition probabilities” [between states] (W. Heisenberg, Letter to 
Kronig, 5 June 1925; cited in Mehra and Rechenberg 2001, v. 2, p. 242; emphasis added).34 
Heisenberg’s scheme, thus, extended Bohr’s 1913 concept of discrete transitions, 
“quantum jumps,” which had no mechanical or geometrical model, between stationary 
states, which had a mechanical and geometrical model and were conceived by Bohr as 
elliptical orbits on the planetary model in classical physics. “This concept,” as Heisenberg 
noted later, “had been somewhat doubtful from the beginning,” because of “the discrepancy 
between the calculated orbital frequency of the electrons and the frequency of the emitted 
radiation,” which had to be interpreted as a limitation to the concept of the electronic orbit” 
(Heisenberg 1962, p. 41; emphasis added). This observation, made in the late 1950s, may 
                                                        
33 I am not referring here to the concept of quantum state as a state vector in a Hilbert space, which 
is, in the present view, merely part of the predictive machinery of quantum mechanics and has no 
physical meaning in itself. 
34 More classical views of the situation have persisted as well, at the earlier stages of QM especially 
following Schrödinger’s introduction of his wave mechanics, which appeared more amenable to 
such views. The debates concerning the subject have never subsided and were rekindled by Bell’s 
and the Kochen-Specker theorems, and related findings. 
  48 
represent more Heisenberg’s own thinking around the time of his creation of quantum 
mechanics in 1925, than Bohr’s earlier thinking. If anything, it was Bohr’s idea of quantum 
jump that appeared doubtful to most when Bohr introduced his theory. Be that as it may on 
this score, accepting this discrepancy and, thus, dissociating these two types of frequencies 
was a revolutionary move on Bohr’s part, emphasized as such by Bohr himself. As he said 
in his first paper presenting his theory, “How much the above interpretation differs from 
an interpretation based on the ordinary electrodynamics is perhaps most clearly shown by 
the fact that we have been forced to assume that a system of electrons will absorb radiation 
of a frequency different from the frequency of vibration of electrons calculated in the 
ordinary way” (Bohr 1913, p. 149). 
In retrospect, Bohr’s 1913 postulates almost cried out: “Give up the idea of orbits!” 
Heisenberg did just that. He rethought stationary states as just energy states, permitting no 
mechanical model or geometrical representation either, thus excluding from his theory the 
mechanical picture of both stationary states and transitions between them, manifested in 
measurable quantities and changes in the values of these quantities. In sum, he excluded 
both altogether. He was also able, as his greatest achievement, to give a workable 
mathematics to this physics, the mathematics of quantum mechanics. This took another 
decade, however. A retrospective view, while not without its benefits, is rarely a reliable 
guide to how discoveries occur. A few things had to happen before the cry “give up the 
idea of orbits” could have been heard or, for that matter, even made, because the dominant 
sentiment at the time was that a return to a more classical picture of the atomic constitution 
was likely. While the hope for this return, personified by Einstein, has remained alive 
among physicists and philosophers, and is still as fervent as ever even now, before 
Heisenberg the type of theory he proposed was all but inconceivable. However, although 
Bohr’s theory had, in the hands of Bohr and others, many impressive successes to its credit 
during the decade following its introduction, the idea of orbits for stationary states ran into 
major and ultimately insurmountable difficulties. On the other hand, the approach to 
quantum theory as a (probabilistic or statistical) theory predicting the transitions between 
states was working well in Bohr’s theory itself and beyond, as in Einstein’s remarkable 
1916 treatment, using Bohr’s theory, of spontaneous and induced emission and absorption 
of radiation (Einstein 1916a, b; Freidel 2016). So, the situation became ripe for giving up 
the concept of an orbit in considering the behavior of the electrons in atoms, at least ripe 
for Heisenberg. Not everyone was ready to do so, even among those whom one would have 
expected to. Thus, as is clear from Heisenberg’s letter to him, Pauli, who did question the 
idea of orbits previously, appears to have failed to completely renounce it at the time of 
Heisenberg’s discovery, although he did so soon thereafter: 
 
But I do not know what you mean by orbits that fall into the nucleus. We certainly agree 
that already the kinematics of quantum theory is totally different from that of classical 
theory (hv-relations), hence I do not see any geometrically-controllable sense in the 
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statement “falling into the nucleus.” It is really my conviction that an interpretation of the 
Rydberg formula in terms of circular and elliptical orbits (according to classical geometry) 
does not have the slightest physical significance. And all my wretched efforts are devoted 
to killing totally the concept of an orbit—which one cannot observe anyway—and replace 
it by a more suitable one. (Heisenberg to Pauli, 9 July 1925; cited in Mehra and Reihenberg 
2001, v. 2, p. 284; emphasis added) 
 
The reference to “classical geometry” is worth noting, in juxtaposition to Heisenberg’s 
“algebraic method,” bemoaned by Einstein. The concept of orbits remained applicable and 
useful for the higher orbits, when “electrons should move at a large distance from the 
nucleus just as they do when one sees them moving through a cloud chamber,” in effect, a 
manifestation of the correspondence principle, very effectively used, in its mathematical 
form, by Heisenberg in his scheme (Heisenberg 1962, p. 41). It should be kept in mind that 
the electrons’ behavior is still quantum in these regions and, hence, the concept of motion 
is a classical approximation, ultimately possible because one could only observe the effects 
of this behavior in the measuring instruments. On the other hand, certain quantum effects, 
which are not registered when we deal with classical objects, could still in principle be 
observed, albeit with a low probability. 
Indeed, Heisenberg’s statement in his letter to Kronig cited above also suggests that 
his new QM was about the interactions between atoms in the observed external world, 
specifically the measuring instruments involved (or those objects in nature that could be 
used as instruments), a view manifested in Heisenberg’s paper. All that one could say about 
quantum objects and processes could only concern their effects on measuring instruments, 
effects probabilistically or statistically predictable by means of QM. In this sense, as 
explained earlier, one can speak of a physical state of a quantum object, such as an electron, 
only insofar as a certain change is registered in the measuring instruments associated with 
this electron, say a registered change in two energy levels, which we associate with the 
corresponding stationary states, or a registered change in the position state of a free 
electron. As noted earlier, while it is reasonable to assume that something has “changed” 
or “happened” between these two registered events, one must, especially if one adopts the 
RWR-type view, keep in mind, that, to return to Heisenberg’s formulation, “these concepts 
cannot be applied in the space between the observations; they can only be applied at the 
points of observation” (Heisenberg 1962, p. 145).35 We certainly have no means to 
                                                        
35 J. Barbour’s concept of “Platonia,” an underlying reality without change and motion (the idea 
originating with Parmenides) appears to derive from this circumstance (Barbour 1999). From the 
present, RWR-principle-based, viewpoint, however, it does not follow that everything “stands still,” 
at the ultimate level of reality, because the concept of reality without change and motion would not 
apply any more than that of change or motion. It only follows that no human concept of time or 
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ascertain where exactly and when exactly this change occurred: it always happens, in 
Lucretius’s phrase (used by him, admittedly, in the classical picture of the swerve of an 
atom from a given trajectory), “at quite uncertain times, and uncertain places” (Lucretius 
2009,  Book Two, ll. 218–219, p. 42).36 Nor, again, do we have means to repeat any such 
experiment exactly, but could only have the verifiable statistics of many repeated 
experiments, each of which will generally lead to a different outcome. 
The mathematical correspondence principle motivated Heisenberg’s decision to retain 
the equations of classical mechanics, while, necessarily, introducing mathematically 
different variables. Because these variables were different, the correspondence with 
classical theory was defined by the fact that new quantum variables could be substituted 
for by conventional classical variables (such as those of position and momentum) in the 
classical limit, when, as explained above, the electrons were far away from the nuclei and 
when, accordingly, a classical concept, such as orbits, could be retained, even though the 
electrons’ behavior was still quantum. While using the correspondence principle (in its 
original ad hoc way), the old quantum theory was defined by the strategy of retaining the 
variables of classical mechanics while adjusting the equations to achieve better predictions. 
Heisenberg’s reversal of this strategy was, thus, unexpected as well. This reversal, 
however, required a radical change of the role these equations were to play. They no longer 
represented the motion of the objects considered, but instead served as mathematical means 
enabling probabilistic or statistical predictions concerning effects (in this case spectra, 
assumed to result from the emission of radiation by electrons) manifested in measuring 
instruments.   
Heisenberg’s discovery was a remarkable achievement, ranked among the greatest in 
the history of physics.37 A detailed discussion of his derivation of QM is beyond my 
scope.38 Several key features of his thinking are, however, worth commenting on. 
Heisenberg’s new quantum variables, to which the equations of QM (again, formally the 
same as those of classical mechanics) applied, were infinite unbounded matrices with 
complex elements. Their multiplication, which Heisenberg, who was famously unaware of 
the existence of matrix algebra and reinvented it, had to define, is in general not 
                                                        
space (and there is no other such concept than human) would be applicable either. Heisenberg 
certainly would not subscribe to Barbour’s argument.  
36 See (Rovelli 1998) for a different viewpoint on this situation. 
37 This does not mean that Heisenberg’s invention of QM was independent of, or was not helped by, 
preceding contributions, even beyond the key pertinent works in the old quantum theory by Einstein, 
Bohr, Sommerfeld, and others. H. Kramers’s work on dispersion and his collaboration with 
Heisenberg on the subject were especially important for Heisenberg’s work. See (Mehra and 
Rechenberg 2001, v. 2) for this history. 
38 I have considered this derivation in detail on previous occasions, most recently in (Plotnitsky 
2016, pp. 68-83). 
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commutative.  It is not even entirely clear whether Heisenberg even thought of these 
variables as matrices, as opposed to, in his words, just “ensembles of quantities” 
(Heisenberg 1925, p. 264). Their properly matrix nature was realized by M. Born, who, 
together with P. Jordan, developed Heisenberg’s scheme into matrix mechanics (Born and 
Jordan 1925). Essentially, these variables are operators in Hilbert spaces over complex 
numbers, although Heisenberg did not know this at the time either. Such mathematical 
objects had never been used in physics previously, and their noncommutative nature was, 
initially, questionable and even off-putting for some, including Heisenberg himself and 
Pauli, both of whom, however, quickly changed their views on this point (Plotnitsky 2009, 
pp. 90, 111, 116).39 In fact, while matrix algebra, in both finite and infinite dimensions, 
was developed in mathematics by then, unbounded infinite matrices were not previously 
studied. As became apparent later, such matrices are necessary to derive the uncertainty 
relations for continuous variables. 
Heisenberg’s invention of his matrices was made possible by the idea of arranging 
algebraic elements corresponding to numerical quantities (transition probabilities or, more 
accurately, probability density functions) into infinite square tables, at least in effect, given 
the double-indexing of these elements. It is true that, once one deals with transitions 
between stationary states and their energy levels, matrices appear naturally, with rows and 
columns defined by these transitions. This naturalness, however, became apparent or, one 
might say, became natural, only in retrospect. This arrangement was the phenomenological 
construction of a mathematical object, a matrix, considered as an element of a mathematical 
structure, part of (infinite-dimensional) linear algebra, essentially, again, an operator 
algebra, now known as that of “observables,” in a Hilbert space over complex numbers. 
There are further details: for example, as unbounded self-adjoint operators, defined on 
infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces, these matrices do not form an algebra with respect to 
the composition as a noncommutative product, although some of them satisfy the canonical 
commutation relation. These details are, however, secondary here. Most crucial was that 
the concept was used physically in a fundamentally different way from the way in which 
representational concepts of classical physics or relativity were used. Heisenberg’s 
variables were mathematical entities enabling probabilistic or statistical predictions 
concerning the relationships between quantum phenomena, observed in measuring 
instruments, without providing a mathematically idealized representation of the behavior 
of the quantum objects responsible for the appearance of these phenomena. 
                                                        
39 Technically, tensors of the second rank, used in relativity, are matrices and thus are, in general, 
noncommutative. However, their role is entirely different that of from matrices or operators in QM, 
where they replace, as complex-valued variables in the equations of the quantum-mechanical 
formalism, real-valued functions used in the equations of classical physics to represent (in realist 
mathematical models) physical variables, such as position, momentum, and so forth.  
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In this regard, although understandable historically, the term “observables” may be 
misleading and is especially inadequate if one adopts a nonrealist view. Beginning with his 
response to Heisenberg’s discovery of QM, Bohr saw the quantum-mechanical formalism 
as “symbolic” in the following sense. While the mathematical symbols used in it appear, 
as variables, in the same equations as those used in classical mechanics, these symbols did 
not represent physical quantities pertaining to quantum objects themselves and their 
behavior, in the way such symbols do in classical mechanics. By the same token, the 
equations of QM, Schrödinger’s equation included, no longer function as equations of 
motion, at least in the sense of classical physics or relativity. Instead they are part of the 
probabilistic mathematical technology of QM, enabling us to compile, in Schrödinger’s 
terms, expectation-catalogs concerning possible future quantum events (Schrödinger 
1935a, p. 154).   
Heisenberg began his derivation with an observation that reflects a radical departure, 
which he saw as necessary, from the classical ideal of continuous mathematical 
representation of individual physical processes in dealing with discrete quantum events, 
still using continuous mathematics to do so, but no longer in a representational, but only 
probabilistically predictive, way. He says: “in quantum theory it has not been possible to 
associate the electron with a point in space, considered as a function of time, by means of 
observable quantities. However, even in quantum theory it is possible to ascribe to an 
electron the emission of radiation” [the effect of which emission could be observed in a 
measuring instrument] (Heisenberg 1925, p. 263; emphasis added). My emphasis reflects 
the fact that, in principle, a measurement could associate an electron with a point in space, 
but not by linking this association to a function of time representing the continuous motion 
of this electron, in the way it is possible in classical mechanics.40 If one adopts an RWR-
type interpretation, one cannot assign any properties to quantum objects themselves, not 
even single such properties, such as that of having a position, rather than only certain joint 
ones, which are precluded by the uncertainty relations. One could only assign physical 
properties to the measuring instruments involved. Heisenberg described his next task as 
follows, which, again, shows the genealogy of his derivation in Bohr’s atomic theory, 
through the QD principle: “In order to characterize this radiation we first need the 
frequencies which appear as functions of two variables. In quantum theory these functions 
are in the form: 
 
v(n, n - a) =1/h {W(n) - W (n - a)} 
 
                                                        
40 Matrix mechanics did not offer a treatment of stationary states, in which and only in which one 
could in principle speak of the position of an electron in an atom, although while there are stationary 
(energy) states, an electron itself is never stationary, is always in motion. 
  53 
and in classical theory in the form 
 
v(n,a) = av(n) = a/h(dW/dn)” (Heisenberg 1925, p. 263). 
 
This difference leads to a difference between classical and quantum theories as regards 
the combination relations for frequencies, which, in the quantum case, correspond to the 
Rydberg-Ritz combination rules, again, reflecting, to return to Heisenberg’s locution, “the 
discrepancy between the calculated orbital frequency of the electrons and the frequency of 
the emitted radiation.” However, “in order to complete the description of radiation [in 
correspondence, by the mathematical correspondence principle, with the classical Fourier 
representation of motion] it is necessary to have not only frequencies but also the 
amplitudes” (Heisenberg 1925, p. 263). On the one hand, then, by the correspondence 
principle, the new, quantum-mechanical equations must formally contain amplitudes, as 
well as frequencies. On the other hand, these amplitudes could no longer serve their 
classical physical function (as part of a continuous representation of motion) and are 
instead related to discrete transitions between stationary states. (Nor ultimately do 
frequencies because of the non-classical character of the Rydberg-Ritz combination rules.) 
In Heisenberg’s theory and in QM since then, these “amplitudes” are no longer amplitudes 
of physical motions, which makes the name “amplitude” itself an artificial, symbolic term. 
In commenting on linear superposition in quantum mechanics in his classic book, Dirac 
emphasized this difference: “the superposition that occurs in quantum mechanics is of an 
essentially different nature from any occurring in the classical theory” (Dirac 1958, p. 14). 
In nonrealist interpretations, this superposition is not even physical: it is only mathematical.  
In classical physics this mathematics represents physical processes; in quantum mechanics, 
at least in the nonrealist view, it does not. Amplitudes are instead linked to the probabilities 
of transitions between stationary states: they are essentially what we now call probability 
amplitudes. The corresponding probabilities are derived, from Heisenberg’s matrices, by a 
form of Born’s rule for this limited case. (As I said, technically, one needs to use the 
probability density functions, but this does not affect the essential point in question.) The 
standard rule for adding the probabilities of alternative outcomes is changed to adding the 
corresponding amplitudes and deriving the final probability by squaring the modulus of the 
sum. This reconceptualization of “amplitude” is an extension of the conceptual shift from 
finding the probability of finding an electron in a given state to the probability of the 
electron’s discrete transitions (“quantum jumps”) from one state to another, found in 
Bohr’s theory and manifested in Bohr’s frequency rule. 
One can also see here, as part of Heisenberg’s “purely algebraic method,” a conversion 
of the classical continuous geometrical picture of oscillation or wave propagation, as 
defined by frequencies and amplitudes, into the algebra of probabilities of transitions 
between discrete quantum events. This conversion is accomplished by redefining 
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amplitudes, as just explained. Schrödinger tried to “restore” a wave-type continuous 
geometry to quantum theory in his wave mechanics, but he could not successfully 
overcome the irreducible nature of quantum discreteness, manifested in the QD principle. 
His formalism itself can be (and quickly was) interpreted on Heisenberg’s lines under 
discussion, which is not surprising given the mathematical equivalence of both schemes, 
established shortly thereafter, by Schrödinger, among others.  
The mathematical structure thus emerging is in effect that of vectors and (in general, 
noncommuting) Hermitian operators in complex Hilbert spaces, which are infinite-
dimensional, given that one deals with continuous variables. Heisenberg explains the 
situation in these terms in (Heisenberg 1930, pp.111-122). In his original paper, which 
reflect his thinking more directly, he argues as follows: 
 
The amplitudes may be treated as complex vectors, each determined by six independent 
components, and they determine both the polarization and the phase. As the amplitudes are 
also functions of the two variables n and a, the corresponding part of the radiation is given 
by the following expressions: 
Quantum-theoretical: 
 
Re{A (n, n - a)eiw(n, n - a)t} 
 
Classical: 
 
Re{Aa (n)eiw(n)at}. (Heisenberg 1925, p. 263) 
 
The problem—a difficult and, “at first sight,” even insurmountable problem—is now 
apparent: “the phase contained in A would seem to be devoid of physical significance in 
quantum theory, since in this theory frequencies are in general not commensurable with 
their harmonics” (Heisenberg 1925, pp. 263-264). This incommensurability, which is in an 
irreconcilable conflict with classical electrodynamics, was, again, one of the most radical 
features of Bohr’s 1913 atomic theory, on which Heisenberg builds here. His strategy is 
still based on the shift from calculating the probability of finding a moving electron in a 
given state to calculating the probability of an electron’s transition from one state to 
another, without describing the physical mechanism responsible for this transition. 
Heisenberg’s theory is even more in harmony with this approach because there are no 
longer orbits, where the preceding approach would still apply. Just as Bohr before him, 
Heisenberg converts this, to the classical way of thinking, insurmountable problem into a 
possible solution, defined by and defining a new way of thinking. Heisenberg invents QM 
by showing that the real problem here is classical way of thinking, because it is not in 
accord with how nature or, more accurately, our interactions with nature work when 
  55 
dealing with the atomic constitution of nature. One needs a new way of theoretical thinking 
to restore this accord.  
Heisenberg says next: “However, we shall see presently that also in quantum theory 
the phase has a definitive significance which is analogous to its significance in classical 
theory” (Heisenberg 1925, p. 264; emphasis added). “Analogous” could only mean here 
that, rather than being analogous physically, the way the phase enters mathematically is 
analogous to the way the classical phase enters mathematically in classical theory, in 
accordance with the mathematical form of the correspondence principle, insofar as 
quantum-mechanical equations are formally the same as those of classical physics. 
Heisenberg only considered a toy model of an aharmonic quantum oscillator, and thus 
needed only a Newtonian equation for it, rather than the Hamiltonian equations required 
for a full-fledged theory, developed by Born and Jordan (Born and Jordan 1925; Born, 
Heisenberg, and Jordan 1926). As Heisenberg explains, if one considers “a given quantity 
x(t) [a coordinate as a function of time] in classical theory, this can be regarded as 
represented by a set of quantities of the form 
 
Aa (n)eiw(n)at, 
 
which, depending on whether the motion is periodic or not, can be combined into a 
sum or integral which represents x(t): 
 
                                                             + ∞ 
x(n, t) =∑a Aa (n) eiw(n)at 
                                                              – ∞ 
or 
                                                     +∞ 
x(n, t) =∫ Aa (n) eiw(n)at da ”   (Heisenberg 1925, p. 264). −∞
      
Heisenberg next makes his most decisive and most extraordinary move. He notes that “a 
similar combination of the corresponding quantum-theoretical quantities seems to be 
impossible in a unique manner and therefore not meaningful, in view of the equal weight 
of the variables n and n - a” (Heisenberg 1925, p. 264). “However,” he says, “one might 
readily regard the ensemble of quantities A (n, n - a)eiw(n, n - a)t [an infinite square matrix] 
as a representation of the quantity x(t)” (Heisenberg 1925, p. 264). The arrangement of the 
data into these ensembles, in effect square tables, is a brilliant and, as I said, in retrospect, 
but only in retrospect, natural way to connect the relationships (transitions) between 
stationary states. However, it does not by itself establish an algebra of these arrangements, 
for which one needs to find the rigorous rules for adding and multiplying these elements. 
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Otherwise Heisenberg cannot use these variables in the equations of his new mechanics. 
To produce a quantum-theoretical version of the classical equation of motion that he 
considered, which would apply (no longer as an equation of motion!) to these new 
variables, Heisenberg needs to be able to construct the powers of such quantities, beginning 
with x(t)2, which is actually all that he needs for his equation. The answer in classical theory 
is obvious and, for the reasons just explained, obviously unworkable in quantum theory. 
Now, “in quantum theory,” Heisenberg proposes, “it seems that the simplest and most 
natural assumption would be to replace classical [Fourier] equations … by 
 
                                                          + ∞ 
B(n, n - b)eiw(n, n - b)t =∑a A(n, n-a)A(n-a, n - b)eiw(n, n - b )t 
                                                          – ∞ 
or  
                + ∞ 
= ∫ A(n, n-a)A(n-a, n - b)eiw(n, n - b )t da” (Heisenberg 1925, p. 265). 
                – ∞ 
 
This is the main mathematical postulate, the (matrix) multiplication postulate, of 
Heisenberg’s new theory, “and in fact this type of combination is an almost necessary 
consequence of the frequency combination rules” (Heisenberg 1925, p. 265). This 
combination of the particular arrangement of the data and the construction of an algebra of 
multiplying his new variables is Heisenberg’s great invention. (As I noted, technically, 
these matrices do not form an algebra with respect to the composition as a noncommutative 
product.) The “naturalness” of this construction or Heisenberg’s claim that it is “an almost 
necessary consequence of the frequency combination rules” should not hide the radical and 
innovative nature of Heisenberg’s discovery, one of the greatest in twentieth-century 
physics. If anything, these are the frequency combination rules that become a necessary 
consequence of this construction. 
Although it is commutative in the case of squaring a given variable, x2, this 
multiplication is in general noncommutative, expressly for position and momentum 
variables, and Heisenberg, without quite realizing, used this noncommutativity in solving 
his equation, as Dirac was the first to notice. Heisenberg was of course aware that his new 
variables, in general, did not commute, although the significance of this fact became fully 
apparent only with Born and Jordan’s paper (Born and Jordan 2015). Taking his inspiration 
from Einstein’s “kinematics” of special relativity, Heisenberg spoke of his new algebra of 
matrices as the “new kinematics.” This was not the best choice of term because his new 
variables no longer described or were even related to motion as the term kinematic would 
suggest, one of many, historically understandable, but potentially confusing terms. 
Planck’s constant, h, which is a dimensional, dynamic entity, has played no role thus far. 
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Technically, the theory, as Einstein never stopped lamenting, wasn’t even a mechanics, 
insofar as it did not offer a representation of individual quantum processes, or for that 
matter of anything else. As noted earlier, “observables,” for the corresponding operators, 
and “states,” for Hilbert-space vectors (in the language we use now), are other such terms: 
we never observe these “observables” or “states,” or physically assign them to quantum 
objects (or to anything else), but only use them to predict, probabilistically, what will be 
observed in measuring instruments. To make these predictions, one will need Planck’s 
constant, h, which thus enters as part of this new relation between the data in question and 
the mathematics of the theory.  
That in general his new variables did not commute, PQ – QP ≠ 0, was, again, an 
especially novel feature of Heisenberg’s model.  This feature, which was an automatic 
mathematical consequence of his choice of his variables, proved to be momentous 
physically. Most famously, it came to represent in the formalism Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
relations constraining certain simultaneous measurements, such as those of the momentum 
(P) and the coordinate (Q), associated with a given quantum object in the mathematical 
formalism of quantum mechanics and (correlatively) the complementary nature of such 
measurements in Bohr’s sense, explained below. Although it took a bit longer to realize 
the deeper physical nature of the quantum-mechanical situation to which Heisenberg’s new 
mechanics responded, the noncommutative character of quantum variables should not be 
surprising. J. Schwinger instructively commented on the subject, in part following Bohr, 
whose influence is manifested in his lecture on quantum theory that I am about to cite. 
Schwinger does note the most commonly stated physical feature corresponding to this 
character, namely, that if one measures two physical properties in one order, and then in 
the other, the outcome would in general be different in quantum physics (while they are 
the same in classical physics). But he goes further in explaining why this is the case and 
what are its implications for the mathematical formalism of quantum theory:  
 
If we once recognize that the act of measurement introduces in the [microscopic] object of 
measurement changes which are not arbitrarily small, and which cannot be precisely 
controlled … then every time we make a measurement, we introduced a new physical 
situation and we can no longer be sure that the new physical situation corresponds to the 
same physical properties which we had obtained by an earlier measurement. In other words, 
if you measure two physical properties in one order, and then the other, which classically 
would absolutely make no difference, these in the microscopic realm are simply two 
different experiments …  
 So, therefore, the mathematical scheme can certainly not be the assignment, the 
association, or the representation of physical properties by numbers because numbers do 
not have this property of depending upon the order in which the measurements are carried 
out. … We must instead look for a new mathematical scheme in which the order of 
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performance of physical operations is represented by an order of performance of 
mathematical operations. (pp. 40-42, cited in Schweber 1994, p. 361)41 
 
As must be clear from the preceding discussion, this is not how Heisenberg discovered the 
mathematical scheme of QM, in particular given that the noncommutativity of some among 
the operators representing quantum observables was not his starting point but a 
consequence of the multiplication rule for his matrices. The type of thinking described by 
Schwinger is more in accord with recent quantum-informational approaches of deriving 
the structure of quantum theory, primarily QTFD, from the (formalized) structure of 
quantum measurements.42 The difficulty here is that any such scheme requires a great deal 
of nontrivial mathematics, especially at the time, such as that of Hilbert spaces (infinite-
dimensional ones for continuous variables) over complex numbers and the use of operators 
to represent quantum variables, and, in addition, rules, such as Born’s rule, by means of 
which the formalism is related to the probabilities or statistics of quantum predictions. It is 
not a matter of a direct representation of the order-dependent nature or structure of 
measurement in question by the formalism, in part because of the probabilistic or statistical 
nature of quantum predictions. We are so familiar with the relationships between the 
noncommutative nature of QM and the order in which some among quantum measurements 
are performed and the corresponding predictions are obtained, that we forget the indirect 
or, in Bohr’s and Schwinger’s terms, “symbolic,” rather than directly representative, nature 
of these relationships. 
It is worth adding that, as explained earlier and as Schwinger stresses in his lecture, no 
identical assignment of the single quantity is ever possible, or in any event ever guaranteed, 
in two “identically” prepared experiments in the way it can be in classical physics 
(Schweber 1994, p. 360). This is because quantum experiments cannot be controlled so as 
to identically prepare quantum objects but only so as to identically prepare the measuring 
instruments involved, because this behavior can be considered classical. The quantum 
                                                        
41 My citation of the pages of the transcript of Schwinger’s lecture, which is unpublished, follows 
S. Schweber, who cites the lecture at length in (Schweber 1994). “Microscopic” refers here to the 
microscopic constitution of quantum objects, and not to their actual size. Quantum objects could be 
macroscopic in size (Bose-Einstein condensates and SQUIDs are notable examples). Their quantum 
behavior, however, is determined by their microscopic quantum constitution, and thus, by the role 
of Planck’s constant, h, in any quantum measurement used in observing them. Accordingly, one 
needs measuring instruments, described classically but capable of detecting quantum behavior, to 
observe macroscopic quantum objects as quantum.  
42 Schwinger was among those who anticipated these programs, specifically in (Schwinger 2001), 
which is, philosophically, in accord with his lecture cited here but offers a more rigorous approach 
to deriving QM from, in the words of Schwinger’s subtitle, the “symbolism of atomic 
measurement.” See (Jaeger 2016), for a helpful discussion of Schwinger’s approach. 
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strata of measuring instruments, through which they interact with quantum objects, do not 
affect these preparations but only the outcomes of actual measurements. On the other hand, 
this interaction itself is uncontrollable. This fact is central to Bohr’s argument, which 
invokes this “finite and incontrollable interaction” at key junctures of his reply to EPR’s 
paper (Bohr 1935, pp. 697, 700). It follows that the outcomes of repeated, identically 
prepared experiments, including those involving sequences of measurements, cannot be 
controlled even ideally (as they can be in classical physics), and these outcomes will, in 
general, be different. This circumstance makes statistical considerations unavoidable in any 
quantum experiment, and is reflected, among other things, in the statistical character of the 
uncertainty relations. The noncommutative nature of the corresponding quantum variables 
responds to this character as well, along with the uncertainty relations themselves. 
Heisenberg’s famous formula, DqDp @ h (where q is the coordinate, p is the momentum in 
the corresponding direction), is, accordingly, statistical. 
As Schweber says, in commenting on Schwinger’s passage cited above, “Schwinger 
thus made plausible why in quantum mechanics physical properties are set in 
correspondence with noncommutative operators” (Schweber 1994, p. 361). It should be 
noted, however, that at least in Bohr’s or the present view, and it appears, in Schwinger’s 
view as well, the term “correspondence” should not be understood in the sense of the 
(realist) mathematical representation. For, at least in the present view, the operators in 
question only enable (along with other mathematical elements and structures of Hilbert 
spaces, and Born’s or related rules added to them), the statistical predictions concerning 
properties observed in measuring instruments in quantum experiments, and do not 
correspond to any properties of quantum objects themselves. Schwinger appears to follow 
Bohr on this point, and he refers to Bohr and complementarity shortly following this 
passage. There are differences between Schwinger’s and Bohr’s interpretation overall, but 
they do not affect the main point at the moment, which concerns the relationships between 
the irreducibly statistical nature of quantum predictions and the noncommutativity of QM. 
I shall return to the question of the correspondence between mathematical and physical 
properties in quantum theory below in the context of quantum information theory. 
The quantum-mechanical situation that emerged with Heisenberg’s discovery of 
quantum mechanics and then Bohr’s interpretation of it was eventually (sometime in the 
late 1930s) recast by Bohr in terms of his concept of “phenomenon,” defined by what is 
observed in measuring instruments under the impact of quantum objects, in 
contradistinction to quantum objects themselves, which could not be observed or 
represented, or in the present view, even conceived of. According to Bohr: 
 
I advocated the application of the word phenomenon exclusively to refer to the 
observations obtained under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole 
experimental arrangement. In such terminology, the observational problem is free of any 
special intricacy since, in actual experiments, all observations are expressed by 
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unambiguous statements referring, for instance, to the registration of the point at which an 
electron arrives at a photographic plate. Moreover, speaking in such a way is just suited to 
emphasize that the appropriate physical interpretation of the symbolic quantum-
mechanical formalism amounts only to predictions, of determinate or statistical character, 
pertaining to individual phenomena appearing under conditions defined by classical 
physical concepts [describing the observable parts of measuring instruments]. (Bohr 1987, 
v. 2, p. 64) 
 
Phenomena are irreducibly discrete in relation to each other, and, in Bohr’s scheme, one 
cannot assume that there are continuous processes that connect them, especially classically 
causally, even in dealing with elemental individual processes and events. In nonrealist, 
RWR-view-based, interpretations, such as the one adopted by Bohr and implied in this 
passage, QM, again, only estimates the probabilities or statistics of the outcomes of discrete 
future events and tells us nothing about what happens between them. The formalism does 
not describe the data observed and hence quantum phenomena either. These data, defined 
by the bits of classical information, as part of the observed behavior of measuring 
instruments, are described by classical physics, which, however, cannot predict these data, 
either individually or collectively, including quantum correlations. 
Part of Bohr’s concept of phenomenon and the main reason for its introduction was 
that this concept “in principle exclude[s]” any representation or analysis, even if not a 
possible conception, of quantum objects and their behavior, at least, by means of QM (Bohr 
1987, v. 2, p. 62). The concept of phenomenon is, thus, correlative to the RWR-type view, 
reached by Bohr at this stage of his thinking, keeping in mind possible differences between 
his and the present view, which places quantum objects and processes beyond the reach of 
human thought altogether. Physical quantities obtained in quantum measurements and 
defining the physical behavior of certain (classically described) parts of measuring 
instruments are effects of the interactions between quantum objects and these instruments. 
But these properties are no longer assumed to correspond to any properties pertaining to 
quantum objects themselves, even single such properties considered independently, rather 
than only certain joint properties, in accordance with the uncertainty relations. Bohr’s 
earlier views allowed for this type of attribution at the time of measurement and only then. 
However, even this less radical view implied that the physical state of an object cannot be 
defined on the model of classical physics. This is because the latter model requires an 
unambiguous determination of both conjugate quantities for a given object at any moment 
of time and independently of measurement, which is not possible in quantum physics 
because of the uncertainty relations. In Bohr’s ultimate view, however, which his concept 
of phenomenon reflects, an attribution even of a single property to any quantum object as 
such is never possible—before, during, or after measurement. The conditions that 
experimentally obtain in quantum experiments only allow one to rigorously specify 
measurable quantities that could physically pertain to measuring instruments. Even when 
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we do not want to know the momentum or energy of a given quantum object and thus need 
not worry about the uncertainty relations, neither the exact position of this object itself nor 
the actual time at which this “position” is established is ever available and, hence, in any 
way verifiable. Any possible information concerning quantum objects as independent 
entities is lost in “the finite [quantum] and uncontrollable interaction” between quantum 
objects and measuring instruments (Bohr 1935, pp. 697, 700). However, this interaction 
leaves a mark in measuring instruments, a mark, a bit of information, that can be treated as 
a part of a permanent, objective record, which can be discussed, communicated, and so 
forth. The uncertainty relations remain valid, of course. But they now apply to the 
corresponding (classical) variables of suitably prepared measuring instruments, impacted 
by quantum objects. We can either prepare our instruments so as to measure or predict a 
change of momentum of certain parts of those instruments or so as to locate the spot that 
registers an impact by a quantum object, but never do both in the same experiment. The 
uncertainty relations are correlative to the complementary nature of these arrangements. 
Bohr’s argument implies and indeed arises from the assumption of the irreducible 
difference, reaching beyond Kant, between quantum phenomena and quantum objects: 
  
This necessity of discriminating in each experimental arrangement between those parts of 
the physical system considered which are to be treated as measuring instruments and those 
which constitute the objects under investigation may indeed be said to form a principal 
distinction between classical and quantum-mechanical description of physical phenomena. 
It is true that the place within each measuring procedure where this discrimination is made 
is in both cases largely a matter of convenience. While, however, in classical physics the 
distinction between object and measuring agencies does not entail any difference in the 
character of the description of the phenomena concerned, its fundamental importance in 
quantum theory, as we have seen, has its root in the indispensable use of classical concepts 
in the interpretation of all proper measurements, even though the classical theories do not 
suffice in accounting for the new types of regularities with which we are concerned in 
atomic physics. (Bohr 1935, p. 701, 697-697n) 
 
This statement might suggest, and has suggested to some, that, while observable parts of 
measuring instruments are described by means of classical physics, the independent 
behavior of quantum objects is described by means of the quantum-mechanical formalism, 
which possibility, as explained, need not imply a phenomenal representation or 
visualization of these processes, only a mathematical representation of them by this 
formalism. This, however, is not the case. Bohr does say here that observable parts of 
measuring instruments are described by means of classical physics, again, with a crucial 
qualification that this description only concerns these observable parts, because measuring 
instruments also have quantum strata, through which they interact with quantum objects. 
But he does not say and does not mean (there is no evidence to conclude otherwise) that 
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the independent behavior of quantum objects is represented by means of the quantum-
mechanical formalism. As is clear, for example, from his description of his concept of 
phenomena cited above, this formalism is assumed by Bohr to have a strictly 
probabilistically or statistically predictive role, while, as explained in detail earlier, what 
“happens” between experiments cannot be represented, conceptually or possibly (and in 
the present, even if not Bohr’s, view actually) even conceived of, including in terms of 
such concepts as “happening” or “occurrence.” Nor can it be represented mathematically, 
including algebraically. The algebra of QM only predicts what can happens in experiments, 
although, as I said, in his later thinking, Heisenberg appears to give algebra (it is still 
algebra!) a chance to represent the ultimate constitution of nature.  
While “it is true that the place within each measuring procedure where this 
discrimination [between the object and the measuring instrument] is made is … largely a 
matter of convenience” (emphasis added), it is true only largely, but not completely. As 
Bohr says: “In fact, it is an obvious consequence of [Bohr’s] argumentation that in each 
experimental arrangement and measuring procedure we have only a free choice of this 
place within a region where the quantum-mechanical description of the process concerned 
is effectively equivalent with the classical description,” in accordance with the 
correspondence principle (Bohr 1935, p. 701). In other words, quantum objects are always 
on the other side of the “cut” (as it became known) and may even be defined accordingly. 
At one end, by virtue of their classical nature, the individual effects observed in quantum 
experiments can be isolated materially and phenomenally (in the usual sense)—we can 
perceive and analyze them as such—once an experiment is performed. They cannot be 
separated from the process of their physical emergence by our even conceiving of, let alone 
analyzing, this process. This impossibility defines what Bohr sees as the indivisible 
wholeness of phenomena. By contrast, at the other end, quantum objects and processes can 
never be isolated, materially or phenomenally (in the usual sense of phenomenal as 
referring to what appears to our thought), because one cannot, even in principle, represent 
or even conceive of what actually happens at that level. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the 
concept of “actual” (or of “happening”) only applies at the level of measuring instruments 
(Heisenberg 1962, pp. 47, 145).  
The basis for Bohr’s interpretation (in any of its versions) of quantum phenomena and 
QM was, I contend, Heisenberg’s derivation of QM from the principles stated at the outset 
of this section, to which Bohr added the complementarity principle. Although Heisenberg’s 
creativity and inventiveness were remarkable, his derivation was, arguably, not a strictly 
rigorous derivation, although it may depend on how one defines a “rigorous derivation.” 
While borrowing the form of equations from classical mechanics by the mathematical 
correspondence principle was a logical deduction concerning part of the mathematical 
structure of QM, Heisenberg more “guessed” than derived the variables that he needed. 
The mathematical expression of the principles in question was only partially worked out 
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and sometimes more intuited than properly developed, which took place a bit later in the 
work of Born, Jordan, and Heisenberg himself, and in some respects only with von 
Neumann’s recasting of QM into his rigorous form of Hilbert-space formalism. Even when 
offering these more rigorously developed mathematical structures, a derivation of the 
mathematical model, such as the one offered by Heisenberg in his Chicago lecture 
(Heisenberg 1930), might still not be a rigorous derivation of the formalism from first 
principles. As he himself stated there: 
 
It should be distinctly understood, however, this [the deduction of the fundamental 
equation of quantum mechanics] cannot be a deduction in the mathematical sense of the 
word, since the equations to be obtained form themselves the postulates of the theory. 
Although made highly plausible by the following considerations [the same that led him to 
his discovery of QM], their ultimate justification lies in the agreement of their predictions 
with the experiment. (Heisenberg 1930, p. 108) 
 
One might especially argue that it is not sufficiently first-principle-like to see the equations 
of QM as postulates and, in general, prefer a less mixed derivation of quantum theory than 
that of QM by Heisenberg or Schrödinger. One might, accordingly, envision a different 
type of derivation of QM from fundamental principles, especially by avoiding making the 
equations of quantum mechanics postulates of the theory, formally borrowed from classical 
physics, while Heisenberg’s new variables were in fact a guess. Most recent work in this 
direction has been in quantum information theory in dealing with discrete variables and 
finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces (QTFD), as opposed to the infinite-dimensional Hilbert 
spaces needed for continuous variables. This work, however, has marked affinities with 
that of Heisenberg, which, as I argue here, in effect exhibits a quantum-informational, as 
well as and correlatively, structural-nonrealist thinking. I now turn to a discussion of some 
of this work where these affinities and certain key elements of structural realism are 
especially manifested, that of D’Ariano and coworkers and that of L. Hardy.  
 
5. Structural Nonrealism and Quantum Information Theory 
 
D’Ariano, Chiribella, and Perinotti’s (DACP’s) program, developed over the last decade 
and presented \comprehensively in their recent book (D’Ariano et al 2017), belongs to a 
particular trend in quantum information theory, and as most of the work along these lines, 
it deals with discrete variables and the corresponding (finite-dimensional) Hilbert spaces.43 
                                                        
43 Among the key earlier works are J. A. Wheeler’s “it-from-bit” manifesto, cited earlier (Wheeler 
1990), (Zeilinger 1999), (Hardy 2001), and C. Fuchs’s work (e.g., Fuchs 2003). Fuchs’s work 
eventually “mutated” to QBism, a related but different program (e.g., Fuchs et al 2014). As 
mentioned above (note 40) a remarkable earlier precursor is J. Schwinger’s approach to quantum 
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A rigorous (or at least more rigorous than that of founding figures, who discovered QM 
and QFT) derivation of QM, let alone QFT, from fundamental principles remains an open 
question. This is in part because one has to deal with continuous variables, where the 
technical application of the principles of quantum information theory, such as those used 
by DACP, is more complex. DACP’s program does, however, have significant affinities 
with Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s thinking as discussed here. These affinities and, 
correlatively, the connections between DACP’s program and structural nonrealism are my 
main interest in this section. 
DACP’s project is motivated by “a need for a deeper understanding of quantum theory 
[QTFD] in terms of fundamental principles,” and by the aim of deriving QTFD from such 
principles, which, the authors contend, has never been quite achieved by their 
predecessors.44 As indicated earlier, the fluctuations of terms, such as principles, axioms, 
postulates, used in this context may sometimes be confusing and obscure this common aim. 
DACP use the term “axioms” as well, referring to certain propositions on which their 
“principles” are based. On the other hand, while one can surmise their understanding of the 
term “principle” from their use of it, they do not define the concept of “principle” either, 
which is, as I noted, not uncommon. As earlier, I adopt the concept of principle, defined 
above, via Einstein’s concept of a principle theory. This concept is, I would argue, in accord 
with DACP’s use of principles, and their derivation of QTFD, as is that of Hardy, may be 
seen as that of a principle theory in Einstein’s sense.  
The main new feature of their approach is adding to the consideration of QTFD as an 
extension of probability theory (a view found in the works of their predecessors and, it 
might be added applicable to QM as well) “the crucial ingredient of connectivity among 
events” by using the operational framework of “circuits” (pp. 4-5). The framework of 
circuits has been similarly used by others as well, specifically by Hardy, as discussed 
below. This addition allows DACP “to derive key results of quantum information theory 
and general features of quantum theory [QTFD]” without first assuming Hilbert spaces. As 
explained earlier, unlike von Neumann, to whom DACP expressly refer for a contrast with 
their approach, Heisenberg, in his derivation of QM, did not begin with a mathematical 
                                                        
foundations (Schwinger 2001). Admittedly, there are other approaches to relating quantum 
foundations and quantum information, some of which, such as that advanced in (Grinbaum 2015), 
could have been considered in the present context, but most of this work, including that of A. 
Grinbaum, proceeds along different gradients from the one followed here. 
44 I put aside the question to what degree this derivation amounts to a fully rigorous derivation, 
which and, in the first place, the question of what could be considered as a fully rigorous derivation, 
would require a separate analysis. My main concern here is the relationship between their program 
and structural nonrealism, without, again, claiming that the latter is the authors’ own view. Indeed, 
in his recent articles, D’Ariano takes a view that is closer to structural realism than structural 
nonrealism (e.g., D’Ariano 2017). 
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formalism either. He arrived at his formalism (essentially equivalent to the Hilbert-space 
one) from fundamental principles, even if, again, not fully rigorously derived it from these 
principles.  
Among the principles adopted by DACP, the purification principle plays a uniquely 
important role as an essentially quantum principle, because conforming to it distinguishes 
QTFD from classical information theories. Notably, it is the single principle necessary to 
do so, which may not be surprising given the history of quantum theory and attempts at its 
principle or axiomatic derivations, beginning with that of von Neumann. Hardy’s 
pioneering derivation similarly needed only one axiom, the continuity axiom, to do so as 
well (Hardy 2001). In nontechnical terms, the purification principle states that “every 
random preparation of a system can be achieved by a pure preparation of the system with 
an environment, in a way that is essentially unique” (D’Ariano et al 2017, p. 6). The 
principle originates in Schrödinger’s insight in his response, in several papers, including 
his cat-paradox paper (Schrödinger 1935a), to the EPR paper (Einstein et al 1935). This 
insight led Schrödinger to his famous concept of entanglement. According to DACP: 
 
The purification principle stipulates that, whenever you are ignorant about the state of a 
system A, you can always claim that your ignorance comes from the fact that A is part of 
a large [composite] system AB, of which you have full knowledge. When you do this, the 
pure state that you have to assign to the composite system AB is determined by the state of 
A in an essentially unique way. 
 The purification of mixed states is a peculiar feature—surely, not one that we experience 
in our everyday life. How can you claim that you know A and B if you don’t have A alone? 
This counterintuitive feature has been noted in the early days of quantum theory, when 
Erwin Schrödinger famously wrote: “Another way of expressing the peculiar situation is: 
the best possible knowledge of a whole does not necessarily include the best possible 
knowledge of all its parts.” And, in the same paper: “I would not call that one but rather 
the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforced its entire departure 
from classical lines of thought” [Schrödinger 1935b, p. 555]. 
 This is a bold statement, if you think that it was made in 1935! Nowadays, however, 
there is plenty of evidence supporting it. Here are three arguments: first, we know that 
purification, combined with five [other] rather basic principles, picks up quantum theory 
among all possible theories one can imagine. Second, physicists have been trying to 
fabricate toy theories that exhibit quantum-like features without being quantum theory. 
While they succeeded with many features, up to now purification resists: if you want to 
purify mixed states, then quantum theory seems to be the only option, up to minimal 
variations. Third, many important features of quantum theory can be derived directly from 
purification, without the need of deriving quantum theory first. This fact strongly suggests 
that, when it comes to isolating what is specific of [to?] quantum theory, purification just 
hits the spot. 
 The purification of mixed states is specifically quantum. But why should we assume it 
as a fundamental principle of Nature? At first, it looks like a weird feature—and it must 
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look so, because quantum theory itself is weird and if you squeeze it inside a principle, it 
is likely that the principle looks weird too. However, on second thought one realizes that 
purification is a fundamental requirement: essentially, it is the link between physics and 
information theory. Information theory would not make sense without the notions of 
probability and mixed state, for the whole point about information is that there are things 
that we do not know in advance. But in the world of classical physics of Newton and 
Laplace, every event is determined and there is no space for information at the fundamental 
level. In principle, it does not make sense to toss a coin or to play a game of chance, for 
the outcome is already determined and, with sufficient technology and computational 
power, can always be predicted. In contrast, purification tells us that “ignorance is 
physical.” Every mixed state can be generated in a single shot by a reliable procedure, 
which consists of putting two systems in a pure state and discarding one of them. As a 
result of this procedure, the remaining system will be a physical token of our ignorance. 
This discussion suggests that, only if purification holds, information can aspire to a 
fundamental role in physics. (D’Ariano et al 2017, pp. 168-169) 
 
This elaboration needs, in my view, to be made more precise in discriminating between the 
physical states of a quantum system and the mathematical concept of quantum state as a 
vector, a state vector, in the Hilbert-space formalism, even if one take a more realism view 
of the mathematics concept of quantum state, as against a nonrealist, RWR-type, view, in 
which it is only a tool in making an expectation-catalog concerning the future behavior of 
the system considered, technically, again, concerning this system’s interactions with the 
corresponding measuring instruments or, in DACP’s language, circuits. DACP’s 
formulation of the purification principle itself and their derivation of QTFD, which, again, 
does not assume Hilbert spaces first, allows one to differentiate these concepts. I would 
also argue that their overall scheme allows for a nonrealist interpretation, in part because 
of the role of the concept of circuit there, and I shall interpret it in this way here, without, 
however, claiming that this necessarily corresponds to DACP’s own view. Also, the 
purification of mixed state is, technically, the fundamental principle of our interactions 
with nature by means of our experimental technology, rather than of nature itself, except 
of course insofar as we and our technologies are also nature. But then, again, there is no 
other principle of nature than those defined by us in our interactions with nature. 
The main point at the moment is our quantum-informational knowledge, as always 
probabilistic in nature, depends on our informational ignorance, insofar as this knowledge 
cannot be complete in the classical sense, including, crucially, in dealing with individual 
quantum processes and events, which can be treated ideally deterministically in classical 
mechanics. In classical statistical physics, we do have an analogous incompleteness, 
which, however, only precludes such a treatment in practice and not in principle. As 
explained earlier, an ultimate underlying classical causality is assumed in considering 
classical physical systems, the complexity of which prevents us from making deterministic 
predictions concerning them, while, at the same time, the individual constituents of such 
  67 
systems could in principle, and sometimes even in practice, be treated deterministically. 
Accordingly, using the term “analogous” here requires caution. In quantum physics, 
“ignorance is physical,” as DACP say, in that there is no continuity or classical causality, 
but, to return to Heisenberg’s starting point in his derivation of QM, only discrete 
phenomena, defined by the interactions between quantum objects and the word, and 
transitions probabilities between them. 
The purification principle could be related to Bohr’s complementarity, which can be 
seen as a principle as well, or in any event, it may well be an effect of the same ingredient 
in the quantum constitution of nature that is responsible from complementarity or the EPR-
type of effects, as discussed earlier.  Bohr saw the EPR experiment and, thus, implicitly 
entanglement as a manifestation, perhaps the deepest manifestation, of complementarity, 
which already redefined the relationships between the whole and its parts, as against 
classical physics and relativity, or indeed all preceding conceptions of these relationships 
(Bohr 1935; Bohr 1987, v. 2, p. 59; Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 107-154). The mutual exclusivity 
of “parts” that define complementarity also means that these parts are never parts of the 
same whole. Each part is the only whole there is at any given point. Nor can an entangled 
system be seen as merely a sum of its parts, in the way parts sum up to a whole in classical 
physics or relativity. One must keep in mind a) that entanglement represents a particular, 
if extremely and even uniquely important, case of complementarity, which is a more 
general concept (e.g., Plotnitsky 2016, pp. 136-155); and b) that entangled states, at least 
as understood here, are part of the mathematical technology of our statistical predictions 
concerning the outcomes of quantum experiments, rather than represent any real quantum-
level properties. It may, however, be said that entanglement and purification represent a 
completely different type of relation between physical systems because all possible 
measurements or predictions concerning them are defined by the complementary nature of 
the variables involved in these measurements or predictions. 
Thinking in terms of “circuits” is close to Bohr’s thinking concerning the role of 
measuring instruments in the constitution of quantum phenomena, as distinguished from 
quantum objects, which give rise to quantum phenomena by interacting with measuring 
instruments but which are never observable. In Bohr’s interpretation, the concept of 
complementarity applies strictly to certain specifiable measuring arrangements. Circuits 
and their arrangements, too, embody the technological structure of measuring instruments 
capable of detecting and measuring quantum events, and also enabling the probabilistic 
predictions of future events. Their arrangements and operations are enabled by rules that 
should ideally be derived from certain sufficiently natural assumptions. Circuits and their 
arrangements are described classically, and thus physically embody the structure of 
quantum information as a particular structure, a particular form of organization, of classical 
information, which can be used, as in DACP’s (or Hardy’s) program, to derive the 
mathematical formalism of QTFD, comprised of the set of mathematical structures, which 
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essentially amount to those of Hilbert spaces over complex numbers. Bohr (who was also 
dealing primarily with continuous rather than discrete variables) was not concerned with 
such a derivation, but only with an interpretation of an already established formalism. 
While, however, it has multiple historical connections and resonances, such as those 
just indicated, the purification principle has additional features to those provided by 
Schrödinger’s elaboration, cited above, concerning “the characteristic trait of quantum 
mechanics.” Thus, Schrödinger’s analysis does not contain the requirement that if two pure 
states of a composite system AB have the same marginal on system A, then they are 
connected by some reversible transformation on system B, which amounts to the 
assumption that all purifications of a given mixed state are equivalent under local reversible 
operations (D’Ariano et al 2017, pp. 169-170). Schrödinger never saw this “trait” as a 
fundamental principle either: it was only a “trait,” and moreover, “the characteristic trait 
of quantum mechanics,” which he saw as “a doctrine born of distress,” and not necessarily 
a fundamental feature of nature (Schrödinger 1935a, p. 154). By contrast, the purification 
principle is viewed by DACP “as a fundamental principle of Nature,” even if with the 
qualification given above concerning the role of our interactions with nature is defining 
any principle of nature (D’Ariano et al 2017, p. 169).  
While indispensable in the authors’ operational derivation of QTFD, the purification 
principle in itself is not, and cannot be, sufficient to do so. They need five additional 
postulates:  
 
(1) Causality [essentially locality]. Measurement results cannot depend on what is done on 
the system at the output of measurements.  Equivalently: no signal can be sent from the 
future to the past. 
(2) Local discriminability. We can reconstruct the joint state of multiple systems by 
performing local measurements on each system. 
(3) Perfect distinguishability. Every state that is not completely mixed [i.e., if it cannot be 
obtained as a mixture from any other state] can be perfectly distinguished from some other 
state. 
(4) Ideal compression. Every source of information can be encoded in a lossless and 
maximally efficient fashion (lossless means perfectly decodable, maximally efficient means 
that every state of the encoding system represents a state in the [information] source). 
(5) Atomicity of Composition. No side information can hide the composition of two atomic 
transformations. Equivalently: the sequential composition of two precisely known 
transformations is precisely known. (D’Ariano et al 2017, p. 6) 
 
These five informational postulates define a large class of classical probabilistic 
informational theories, while one, again, needs one and only one additional postulate giving 
rise to the corresponding principle, the purification principle, to distinguish QTFD in this 
case. The appearance of these additional principles is not surprising. Heisenberg’s 
grounding principles, the quantum discreteness, QD, principle and the quantum probability 
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or statistics, QP/QS, principles, were not sufficient for him to derive, or again, to arrive at 
QM, either. To do so, he needed the correspondence principle, to which he gave a rigorous 
mathematical form, requiring that both the equation and variables used convert into those 
of classical mechanics in the classical limit, which gave him, as it were, half of the 
architecture of quantum theory. The other half, essentially amounting to a Hilbert-space 
architecture, was supplied by his new matrix variables, which were more guessed than 
rigorously derived by Heisenberg from first principles. There is of course a difference, 
because, unlike those of DACP’s, all of Heisenberg’s principles were essentially quantum-
mechanical in nature and did not apply to classical physics, apart from the fact that the 
equations used were formally those of classical mechanics.  
There are, however, instructive parallels between DACP’s and Heisenberg’s 
approaches. The QP/QS principle is present in both cases, given that DACP see QTFD as 
an operational-probabilistic theory of a special type, defined by the purification postulate. 
As they say in their earlier article: “The operational-probabilistic framework combines the 
operational language of circuits with the toolbox of probability theory: on the one hand 
experiments are described by circuits resulting from the connection of physical devices, on 
the other hand each device in the circuit can have classical outcomes and the theory 
provides the probability distribution of outcomes when the devices are connected to form 
closed circuits (that is, circuits that start with a preparation and end with a measurement)” 
(Chiribella et al 2011, p. 3). This is similar to Heisenberg’s thinking in his paper 
introducing QM. It is true that the concept of “circuit” in not found in Heisenberg and its 
role in DACP’s approach is, again, ultimately closer to Bohr’s view of the role of 
measuring apparatuses and his concept of phenomenon, defined by this role. As I argue 
here, however, the idea that in quantum theory we only deal with transition probabilities 
between the outcomes of the interactions between quantum objects and measuring 
instruments was introduced by Heisenberg, along with and defining quantum mechanics, 
and was then adopted and developed by Bohr in his interpretation. Heisenberg found the 
formalism of QM by using the mathematical correspondence principle, which allowed him 
to adopt the equations of classical mechanics, while changing the classical variables, the 
combination that defined the structure of QM. Heisenberg needed new variables for these 
formally classical equations because the classical variables did not give Bohr’s frequencies 
rules for spectra, and the corresponding probabilities or statistics. With the help of profound 
physical and mathematical intuitions, added to more rigorous physical and mathematical 
argumentation, Heisenberg discovered that these rules are satisfied by, in general, 
noncommuting matrix variables with complex coefficients, related to amplitudes, from 
which one derives, by means of a Born-type rule, probabilities or statistics for transitions 
between stationary states, manifested in spectra observed in measuring devices. It is in this 
way that Heisenberg’s derivation was essentially related to the fact that measuring 
instruments are devices with classically describable observable parts, which are, thus, akin 
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to “operational circuits.” 
DACP’s approach, again, arises from their aim to arrive at the mathematical structure 
of QTFD in a more first-principle-like way, in particular, independently of classical 
physics, which, because of the correspondence principle was central to Heisenberg. 
(Classical physics, to begin with, does not have discrete variables, such as spin, which are 
purely quantum and with which QTFD is associated.) This is accomplished by using the 
rules governing the structure of operational devices, circuits. These rules are more 
empirical, but they are not completely empirical, because circuits are given a mathematical 
structure, even though this structure may be partially defined by the organization, structure, 
of the experimental arrangement in which circuits appear.45 But then, as noted one several 
occasions in this article, nothing is ever completely empirical even in observation. This 
move of DACP’s is parallel to Heisenberg’s arrangement of the quantities he used into the 
square tables, matrices, which was a mathematical invention giving structure to the 
manifolds of physical quantities, ultimately linked to probabilities of transitions between 
stationary states. In fact, this could even be seen in relation to circuits where these 
quantities are observed or (probabilistically) predicted as spectra. Heisenberg, again, 
needed other elements to establish this architecture fully, admittedly, in a way quite 
different from how DACP aim to do this. Nevertheless, something akin the structure of 
circuits was essential for establishing the mathematical structure of Heisenberg’s scheme. 
This scheme related to this structure only by providing the probabilities or statistics of the 
outcomes of discrete quantum experiments, in accord with the QD and QP/QS principles, 
without providing any representation of quantum processes themselves. In other words, in 
accordance with the principles of structural nonrealism, in both cases, DACP’s and 
Heisenberg’s, one deals with two structures: the mathematical structure of the theory used, 
determined by a (mathematical) law of structure, and the correlational informational 
structure of quantum phenomena (observed in circuits), for the emergence of which the 
theory provides no law. These two structures are only related, and given the nature of the 
second structure, could only be related, by means of statistical predictions. The 
mathematized structure of circuits mediates these relationships. Deriving QTFD from the 
                                                        
45 Hence, as I indicated earlier (note 44), to what degree the formalism of QTFD is ultimately derived 
within DACP’s scheme or, again, what constitutes such a derivation requires much additional 
consideration, which cannot be pursued here. One might even question, and some did, the necessity 
of such a “fully rigorous definition.” After all, Heisenberg, at least, as his scheme was developed by 
Born and Jordan, and then differently Dirac (inspired by Heisenberg as well) did establish a correct 
theory, and then Dirac similarly discovered QED as well. As Hardy suggested, at least by his title, 
in his pioneering paper (Hardy 2001), it may be more a matter what are “reasonable” initial 
postulates, although the “reasonableness” of such postulates is not a simple or unconditional matter 
either. It goes without saying that these qualifications in no way diminish the significance of 
DACP’s or Hardy’s work, or that of others pursuing these lines of thinking and research. 
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principles proposed by DACP requires enormous technical work, which should come as 
no surprise, as the derivation of QM was far from easy for Heisenberg and other founding 
figures as well, a fact often forgotten, in part, ironically, by virtue of the power and 
effectiveness of the mathematics of QM. It is next to impossible to do this derivation justice 
here. I would like, however, to consider further the concept of circuit, still focusing on its 
foundational rather than quantum-computational aspects (the concept of circuit originated 
in quantum computing).  
As explained above, circuits represent the arrangements of measuring instruments that 
are capable of quantum measurements and predictions, which are probabilistic or 
statistical, and sometimes, as with the EPR or the EPR-Bohm type of experiments are 
correlated. A realist representation of these arrangements is possible and unproblematic 
because they are described by classical physics, even though they interact with quantum 
objects, and thus have a quantum stratum, which enables this interaction, disregarded by 
this classical representation, luckily, without any detriment to either measurements or 
predictions. The specific structures and the properties of circuits help and ideally enable us 
to derive the formalism of QTFD, that is, the “arrangements” of elements (such as Hilbert-
space operators) and thus the structure, governed by a mathematical law, that define this 
formalism. This formalism, again, has strictly probabilistically or statistically predictive 
relations to what is observed, without representing quantum objects and processes. 
One can gain further insights into the structure of circuits from Hardy’s work. Hardy 
arrives at a different set of main assumptions necessary to derive QTFD than those of 
DACP, but the main strategy is the same: establishing the architecture of circuits that, 
perhaps with additional axioms, would allow one to derive the mathematical formalism of 
QTFD. According to Hardy: 
 
Circuits have: 
• A setting, s(H), given by specifying the setting on each operation. 
• An outcome set, o(H), given by specifying the outcome set at each operation (equals o(A) 
× o(B) × o(C) × o(D) × o(E) in this case). We say the fragment “happened” if the outcome is in 
the outcome set. 
• A wiring, w (E), given by specifying which input/output pairs are wired together. 
(Hardy 2013, p. 7) 
 
With this definition in hand, I shall comment on some of Hardy’s fundamental assumptions 
as discussed by him in a different paper, which make my main point more transparent. 
Hardy proceeds as follows: 
 
We will make two assumptions to set up the framework in this paper. … 
Assumption 1. The probability, Prob (A), for any circuit, A (this has no open inputs or 
outputs), is well conditioned. It is therefore determined by the operations and the wiring of 
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the circuit alone and is independent of settings and outcomes elsewhere. (Hardy 2010, p. 
11) 
 
This is a physical postulate, essentially that of spatial and temporal locality, combined with 
probability or statistics, along the lines of the QP/QS principle. The task now becomes how 
to derive a QTFD that could correctly predict these probabilities. One needs another 
assumption: 
 
Assumption 2: Operations are fully decomposable. …. In words we will say that any 
operation is equivalent to a linear combination of operations each of which consists of an 
effect for each input and a preparation for each output. … 
Assumption 2 introduces a subtly different attitude than the usual one concerning how 
we think about what an operation is. Usually we think of operations as effecting a 
transformation on systems as they pass through. Here we think of an operation as 
corresponding to a bunch of separate effects and preparations. We need not think of 
systems as things that preserve their identity as they pass through—we do not use the same 
labels for wires coming out as going in. This is certainly a more natural attitude when there 
can be different numbers of input and output systems and when they can be of different 
types. Both classical and quantum transformations satisfy this assumption. In spite of the 
different attitude just mentioned, we can implement arbitrary transformations, such as 
unitary transformations in quantum theory, by taking an appropriate sum over such effect 
and preparation operations. (Hardy 2010, pp. 19-20) 
 
This rethinking of the concept of operation is important, especially if one adopts a 
nonrealist, RWR-type, view. For, consistently with this view, an “operation” is now 
defined in terms of observable “effects” of the interactions between quantum objects and 
measuring instruments (or circuits), and not in terms of what happens, even in the course 
of these interactions (let alone apart from them), to the quantum objects or systems, 
considered as independent systems. It is also true and useful (in allowing one to treat 
classical and quantum informational systems within the same overall informational 
framework) that we can treat classical systems in this way as well. In the classical case, 
however, we can also, equivalently, use a more conventional concept of operation 
mentioned here, which is not the case in quantum theory, at least, again, if one adopts a 
nonrealist view. This suggests that quantum systems or quantum operations must be 
distinguished from classical ones by means of certain additional principles or postulates, 
similarly to the way DACP use the purification principle, or Hardy used his continuity 
axiom in his earlier work (Hardy 2001). After a technical discussion of “duotensors” 
(which I put aside), Hardy suggests a principle: 
 
Physics to mathematics correspondence principle. For any physical theory, there [exist] a 
small number of simple hybrid statements that enable us to translate from the physical 
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description to the corresponding mathematical calculation such that the mathematical 
calculation (in appropriate notation) looks the same as the physical description (in 
appropriate notation). 
Such a principle might be useful in obtaining new physical theories (such as a theory 
of quantum gravity). Related ideas to this have been considered by category theorists. A 
category of physical processes can be defined corresponding to the physical description. A 
category corresponding to the mathematical calculation can also be given. The mapping 
from the first category to the second is given by a functor (this takes us from one category 
to another). (Hardy 2010, p. 39) 
 
The language of correspondence should not mislead one into relating this principle to 
Bohr’s correspondence principle, in either Bohr’s initial form or in Heisenberg’s 
mathematical form. The correspondence principle deals with the correspondence between 
different physical theories (such as classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, or later 
on between QM and QFT), possibly established mathematically, insofar as their predictions 
would coincide in the regions when both theories could be used, which converts QM into 
classical mechanics and QFT into QM in the corresponding limits. By contrast, Hardy’s 
“hybrid” construction serves to give the structures to circuits so that these structures could 
then be “translated” into a proper formalism of QTFD, which can then be related to what 
is observed. 
As explained earlier, circuits and their arrangements embody the technological 
structure of measuring instruments capable of detecting quantum events and enabling, by 
means of QTFD, the probabilistic or statistical predictions of future events, in other words, 
a structure that may be mathematizable and translatable into the mathematical formalism 
of QTFD (Hardy’s “physics to mathematics correspondence principle”). The second 
category can be clearly defined mathematically, say, as that of Hilbert spaces and 
morphisms between them. On the other hand, the first category, that is, the structure of its 
objects, which are formalized circuits, and the morphisms between them, is a more 
complex matter, which would require a separate discussion. This discussion cannot be 
undertaken here, except for indicating the following important aspect of the situation. 
As indicated earlier in considering both Schwinger’s argument (concerning the 
relationships between the noncommutative nature of QM and the order-dependence 
quantum measurement) and DACP’s approach, one need not, and in the present, RWR-
type, view, should not, expect a direct representational correspondence between the 
(mathematized) structures of circuits and the mathematical structures of the formalism of 
QTFD. Instead, it is a matter of a translation, of defining a functor, between two categories 
of different structured objects—circuits and that of Hilbert spaces over complex numbers. 
In this respect, Hardy’s formulation above “for any physical theory, there [exist] a small 
number of simple hybrid statements that enable us to translate from the physical description 
to the corresponding mathematical calculation such that the mathematical calculation (in 
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appropriate notation) looks the same as the physical description (in appropriate notation)” 
(emphasis added) might require further qualification as concerns the meaning of the 
expression “looks the same.” His characterization of the functor in question as “virtually 
direct” (emphasis added) may need further qualification as well. Similar questions may be 
posed concerning DACP’s argumentation, but Hardy’s use of category theory helps one to 
better approach these questions. In the view adopted here, the experimentally established 
structure of physical operations could be categorically formalized (the first category 
invoked by Hardy) and categorically or functorially mapped on the structure of certain 
mathematical operations belonging to mathematical objects, such as Hilbert spaces, which, 
again, form a well-defined category (the second category invoked by Hardy). These 
operations enable one to predict, in probabilistic or statistical terms, certain possible future 
data defined within the same experimentally established and categorically formalized 
structure. In other words, the suitably mathematized structures of circuits formalize the 
arrangements of measuring instruments involved and, as a result, enable one to derive the 
mathematical structure of QTFD, which enables correct probabilistic predictions 
concerning the data associated with these structures of circuits (on the basis of 
measurements equally associated with these structures). In essence, the mathematical 
structure of QTFD is analogous, and likely to be equivalent, to the Hilbert-space of the 
formalism. Arguably, however, this derivation is only possible with the help of certain 
additional fundamental principles, such as the purification principle of DACP. One always 
needs, for example, Born’s rule or one or another equivalent rule. 
Indeed, the essence of category theory consists in establishing the relationships 
between multiplicities, “categories,” of objects of different types, for example and in 
particular, geometrical or, more generally, topological objects and algebraic objects, rather 
than, apart from trivial cases, directly (isomorphically) mapping the objects of the first 
category on those of the second. The concept of “category” was introduced in the field of 
algebraic topology and then extended to algebraic geometry in order to help to study certain 
algebraic invariants, such as groups, associated with topological spaces. In 
contradistinction to geometry, defined, as a mathematical discipline, by the concept of 
measurement (geo-metry), topology, as a mathematical discipline, is defined by associating 
an algebraic structure or a set of structures, most especially groups, such as homotopy or 
cohomology groups (which came to play an important role in QFT and string theory) to a 
topological space as a structured object. The structure of a topological space is defined by 
its continuities and discontinuities, and not by its geometry, even if it had a geometry, and 
not all topological spaces do. Insofar as one deforms a given figure continuously (i.e. 
insofar as one does not separate points previously connected and, conversely, does not 
connect points previously separated), the resulting figure or space is considered the same, 
which sameness is difficult and perhaps impossible to think by means of our general 
phenomenal intuition and, hence, is mathematical. The proper mathematical term is 
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“topological equivalence.” Thus, all spheres, of whatever size and however deformed, are 
topologically equivalent, despite the fact that some of the resulting objects are no longer 
spheres geometrically speaking. Such figures are, however, topologically distinct from tori, 
because spheres and tori cannot be converted into each other without disjoining their 
connected points or joining the disconnected ones: the holes in tori make this impossible. 
In modern (categorical) algebraic topology, mathematical objects of each type are arranged 
in “categories” and, within each category, related to one another by collections of mappings 
or “morphisms” (also known as “arrows”), and categories themselves are related by 
“functors.” The category of topological spaces and their morphisms (or a subcategory, such 
as that of differential manifolds and their morphisms) becomes related to a category of 
algebraic objects, such as, again, groups, and their morphisms. These relations between 
these two categories, topological and algebraic, allow one to extract an enormous amount 
of information concerning topological spaces and sometimes, conversely, groups through 
topological spaces to which they may be associated. 
The main point at the moment is the different, rather than isomorphic or homomorphic, 
nature of objects related, categorically, in terms of functors and not in terms of (realist-
like) representations between them. There are morphisms, including isomorphism, in each 
category and functors between categories. Hardy’s “physics to mathematics 
correspondence principle,” becomes, if one adopts the view just outlined, becomes the 
“physics to mathematics functoriality principle:” that is, it may be seen in terms of this type 
of functorial relationship between the category of circuits (which category still requires a 
proper definition, especially as concerns its “morphisms”) and the category of Hilbert 
spaces, finite-dimensional ones in the case of QTFD. These relationships enable one to use 
the “topological” structure of circuits (which provides the input data) and the algebraic 
structures of Hilbert spaces (functorially derived from this topology of circuits) to predict, 
in probabilistic or statistical terms, the data that is expected to be found in the same or 
possibly some other topological structure of circuits. I use the term “topology” 
metaphorically for the moment, while, however, keeping in mind that the structures of 
circuits may be given topology in a mathematically rigorous sense.  
An important and difficult question is that of the relationship between the structure of 
the circuits, defined by the corresponding experimental arrangements, and the infinite-
dimensional mathematical architecture of QM, or the same relationship in QFT. Consider 
the double-slit experiment, say, in the interference pattern setup. It is a circuit, which 
embodies (or could be represented by a scheme that embodies) preparations, 
measurements, and predictions, all manifested in the emergence of the interference pattern. 
I would not presume to be able to describe this setup as a circuit, let alone in any way 
“mathematize” it (although mathematizing in effect amounts to what it would mean to 
describe a circuit). But it is a circuit nevertheless, a complex one, albeit child’s play in 
comparison to the circuitry found in high-energy quantum physics, such as that of the Large 
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Hadron Collider (LHC), which led to the detection of the Higgs boson. 
Such questions will, however, need be addressed if one is to extend such programs to 
derivations of QTFD to QM or to QED and QFT, or beyond as both Hardy and DACP 
aspire to do, along somewhat different gradients. For, important as this task may be, it is 
hardly sufficient for these programs to merely derive already established theories. Their 
ultimate value lies in solving still outstanding problems, in what they can do for the future 
of fundamental physics. Hardy aims to rethink general relativity in operational terms, 
analogous to those of QTFD, and then to reach, in principle, quantum gravity by combining 
the operational frameworks of quantum theory (including QFT) and general relativity 
(Hardy 2007). D’Ariano and co-workers, by contrast, appear first to move from QTFD to 
QFT. In their more recent work, they aim to develop a new approach to QFT, which, as 
based on the concept of quantum cellular automata, is different from the operational 
framework discussed thus far, but shares with it certain key informational features and, 
most especially, the aim of developing quantum field theory from fundamental (first) 
principles. D’Ariano and Pernotti’s derivation of Dirac’s equation is a step in this direction, 
for now in the absence of an external field, essential to the proper QED (D’Ariano and 
Perinotti 2014; D’Ariano 2017). Unlike Dirac’s own or other previous derivations of the 
equation, D’Ariano and Pernotti’s derivation only uses, along with other principles 
(homogeneity, isotropy, and unitarity), the principle of locality, rather than those of special 
relativity. The approach may, in the authors’ view, also offer new possibilities for 
fundamental physics on Planck’s scale, thus suggesting a potential extension of quantum 
informational theory as far as physics can envision now. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Quantum information theory lends itself to the framework of structural nonrealism 
because, in the present interpretation of it, as extending from Heisenberg thinking in his 
discovery of quantum mechanics, it amplifies the nonrealist, RWR-type, view of quantum 
theory as defined by the probabilistic and statistical relationships between structures, 
specifically, between structures defined by laws of structure and structures that preclude 
us from establishing the laws of their emergence. There is no theoretical physics and no 
human thought apart from structures and laws. But the emergence of the structures defining 
quantum phenomena and quantum information is structureless and lawless. Indeed, the 
nature of this emergence might be beyond the reach of thought altogether.  
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